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Abstract
Constitutional scholarship is preoccupied with questions of how
state power should be constrained. The Constitution, however, not
only sets bounds to state action, it also structures the range of
policy options and the rules for making legally effective choices.
This Article analyzes the ensuing constitutional law of agenda
control, focusing on the distribution of such powers between the
three federal branches. This analysis generates two central claims.
First, the Framers incorporated an array of heterogeneous agenda
control devices across the three branches in order to calibrate
intragovernmental relations. These make up a hitherto ignored
constitutional law of agenda control. Second, a surprising number
of these constitutional agenda-setting rules have been ignored or
even circumvented. Political actors have tended to negotiate
alternate distributions of agenda control power at odds with the
original constitutional design. While the ensuing transformation of
the constitutional processes for governance has ambiguous
distributive consequences, there is reason to treat the historical
transformation of constitutional agenda control as on balance a
desirable development.

*

Professor of law, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Kent Barnett, Saul Levmore, and
Nick Stephanopoulos for helpful conversations and comments. All errors are mine alone.
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The Constitutional Law of Agenda Control

Introduction
The ordinary diet of constitutional adjudication is dominated by questions
about state actors’ powers. Can Congress, the Justices ask, regulate certain private
conduct 1 or direct the president’s diplomatic decisions?2 What sort of cases must
Article III forums decide?3 When can the president make recess appointments4 or
preempt state-law procedural rules in the national interest? 5 The resulting
jurisprudence maps limits to government’s ability to act. Constitutional law, to
judge by the case reporters, involves the mapping of institutional limits.
This story is incomplete. There is more to constitutional design than
jealous titration of state power via prohibitory injunctions. This Article
investigates a hitherto unexplored domain of constitutional design—the
constitutional law of agenda control.6 Its central premise is that constitutional
rules do not merely prohibit state action, but also shape how decisions are made.
For example, the Court’s judgment in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry is
superficially a decision about whether the president or Congress determines what
gets printed in U.S. passports.7 More profoundly, it is a dispute about which
branch sets the foreign policy agenda. Similarly, NLRB v. Noel Canning directly
concerns the president’s recess appointment authority, but also allocates power
both initiate or block regulatory agendas between the branches.8 Agenda control
in the federal courts is also a matter of explicit disagreement. The dissenters in
Obergefell v. Hodges perceived an improper effort by “five unelected Justices” to
1

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). For a more recent
reaffirmation of the principle of limited enumerated powers principle, see Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1603 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]o be ‘made in Pursuance’ of the
Constitution, a law must fall within one of Congress' enumerated powers and be promulgated in
accordance with the lawmaking procedures set forth in that document.”).
2
See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015) (invalidating
congressional regulation of U.S. passports’ content as inconsistent with a presidential “recognition
power”).
3
Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015) (allowing consent-based
adjudication of certain state-law claims in bankruptcy court); see also Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct.
2594 (2011) (holding that Article III limits non-Article III delegations).
4
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
5
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 522–23 (2008) (holding that the President lacks authority to
delay Texas executions based on an International Court of Justice judgment).
6
I use the terms agenda control and agenda setting interchangeably in this Article.
7
135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015).
8
Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2550
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foist “their personal vision of liberty upon the American people.” 9 In
contemporaneous cases, though, those same Justices invited litigants to raise
previously dormant constitutional challenges—in effect seeking to shape the
Court’s agenda themselves.10
I advance two main claims about agenda-control rules. First, one of the
Constitution’s original functions was to structure how state actors selected among
issues and picked among potential policy responses. The ensuing rules for agenda
control are distinct from more familiar constitutional limitations on state action,
yet still aim to shape the epistemic and strategic environment of democratic
governance. Second, the Framers’ original allocation of agenda setting power has
not fared well (perhaps explaining its relative neglect by scholars). Interbranch
negotiation and bargaining has led to some agenda control rules being ignored,
even as others are circumvented. As a result, the distribution of agenda-control
powers has drifted far from the arrangement envisaged in 1787.
Let me unpack each of these points in turn. My first task, given the scant
academic attention hitherto paid to agenda control rules, 11 is descriptive and
9

135 S. Ct. 2584, 2640 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing
the Obergefell majority of staking “a naked judicial claim to legislative—indeed, superlegislative—power; a claim fundamentally at odds with our system of government”).
10
In particular, Justice Thomas issued a series of striking concurrences in the 2014 Term that
flagged previously dormant constitutional issues in ways that de facto invite litigants to file future
challenges. See Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1603 (2015) (noting “doubts about
the legitimacy of this Court's precedents concerning the pre-emptive scope of the Natural Gas
Act,” and in effect flagging the issue for future challenge); Dep’t of Transp’n v. Ass’n of Am.
Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240-41 (2015) (calling into question the permissible scope of
legislative guidance and purporting to “identify principles relevant to today's dispute, with an eye
to offering guidance to the lower courts on remand”); Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S.
Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (calling into question “the
legitimacy of our precedents requiring deference to administrative interpretations of regulations,”
including Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945)).
11
A few legal scholars have identified piecemeal some of the agenda setting mechanisms
discussed here. For example, Saul Levmore has offered an influential account of bicameralism as a
solution to incoherence in collective choice and an important analysis of the interaction between
interest-group activity and agenda-setting mechanisms. See Saul Levmore, Voting Paradoxes and
Interest Groups, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 259, 260-61 (1999) (identifying a “link between instability
and [interest group] activity” such that interest groups “will then invest in order to influence …
procedural rules or, what is sometimes the same thing, the agenda setter”). William Eskridge and
John Ferejohn have drawn attention to the way in which lawmaking is “dynamic interaction
between the preferences of the House and Senate (bicameralism) and the President (presentment).”
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 528
(1992). In subsequently work, Eskridge has extended the analysis to congressional committees.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1444–
48 (2008) (describing opportunities for House or Senate members to derail proposed legislation at
“veto-gates,” i.e. necessary stages in the legislative process where one group or another has the
ability to derail a bill). They build on a political-science literature on “veto-gates”—a kind of
concurrence power, in my argot—upon the available range of policy outcomes. See George
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conceptual. Constitutional scholars need a vocabulary to discuss the large domain
of agenda control rules. To that end, I map out the agenda control rules found in
the constitutional text. I then identify three margins along which agenda-setting
rules in the Constitution vary. First, rules can regulate either the starting point of a
decision-making process or, alternatively, require a subsequent concurrence by a
given institution. Second, agenda-setting rules can be intramural—in the sense of
assigning power over a decision to the same entity with ultimate authority to
act—or external, in the sense of splitting the power to decide what subject
government will address from the power to decide that government will, in fact,
act. Finally, and related to the endogenous/exogenous divide, control of the
government’s agenda can be assigned to a state actor or to a private, non-state
actor.
To taxonomize the constitutional law of agenda setting in this fashion, I
draw upon two bodies of political science scholarship. The first focuses
empirically on the ebb and flow of attention to different policy issues, exploring
the incentives for officials and interest groups to compete strategically for
influence,12 and the instruments they use to do so.13 The second, labeled the study
of social choice,14 begins with a pathmarking 1950 article by Kenneth Arrow.15
Tsebelis, Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism,
Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism, 25 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 289, 293 (1995). The
Eskridge-Ferejohn analysis usefully draws attention to how the strategic invocation of sequential
veto-gates shapes the selection of proposals initially introduced into the lawmaking process, an
insight I extend here. See, e.g., Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra, at 532 (noting that “the threat of a
veto significantly affects the location of statutory policy”). Finally, there is a small literature on
the Origination Clause of Article I, Section 7. Rebecca M. Kysar, The "Shell Bill' Game:
Avoidance and the Origination Clause, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 659 (2014) [hereinafter “Kysar, Shell
Bill”] (offering normative proposals to revive the efficacy of the Origination Clause); Rebecca M.
Kysar, On the Constitutionality of Tax Treaties, 38 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2013) (criticizing tax
treaties on Origination Clause grounds); Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of
Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 424-25 (2004) (analyzing effect of the
Origination Clause). This article draws on all these previous analyses, but its aim is more synoptic
than these precursors. Rather than exploring one retail element of the Constitution’s mechanisms
for framing decision-making, it develops a comprehensive approach to the identification and
evaluation of the Constitution’s agenda-setting rules.
12
JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (2d ed. 2011) (exploring
how issues become part of the public agenda); BRIAN D. JONES & FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, THE
POLITICS OF ATTENTION (2d ed. 2005) (examining how policymakers obtain and use information
to legislative agenda).
13
See, e.g., ROBERT W. BENNETT, TALKING IT THROUGH: PUZZLES OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 37
(2003) (developing the concept of “conversational entrepreneurs,” who seed demand among
political elites for policy change); see also Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, Framing
Theory, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 103 (2007) (providing an overview of such framing effects).
14
My focus here is social choice literature catalyzed by Arrow’s work on the transformation of
individual preferences into collective choices. For useful summaries of the key technical results in
this literature, see AMARTYA SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970) [hereinafter
“SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE”], and Amartya Sen, Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination, 45
ECONOMETRICA 53 (1977). This literature is distinct from the public choice scholarship, which
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Arrow developed a “general possibility theorem” that, in rough paraphrase,
demonstrates that any process for choosing between three or more individual
preferences over “alternative social states” will either produce incoherent results
or, alternatively, violate “reasonable-looking” conditions for democratic choice.16
In the influential gloss offered by political scientist William Riker, Arrow’s
theorem shows that “so long as a society preserves democratic institutions, its
members can expect that some of their social choices will be unordered or
inconsistent.” 17 Instead, those in power can manipulate the agenda—or the
inclination of participants to vote strategically—to determine the outputs of a
collective-choice mechanism. 18 Legal scholars have been cognizant of social
choice theory for decades now, but have focused on its negative implications for
the coherence of legislative and judicial outputs.19 This Article exploits a different
insight from social-choice theory: that there are many different ways of managing
centers on the formation and behavior of various interest groups in the face of collective action
costs. MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GOODS 2 (1965). Social choice and public choice analyses are sometimes concatenated to generate
mutually reinforcing justifications for normative reform proposals. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein,
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 410 (1989) (invoking social
choice theory to support “the findings of public choice theory [that] would treat statutes as lacking
coherent normative underpinnings”) [hereinafter “Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes”]; William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Politics without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory
Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 284 (1988) (invoking Arrow’s theorem to similar ends).
14
OLSEN, supra note 13, at 2.
15
Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POL. ECON. 328 (1950);
see also KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963).
16
ERIC MASKIN & AMARTYA SEN, THE ARROW IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM 33-36, 38 (2014).
17
WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM 136 (1982) [hereinafter “Riker, Liberalism
against Populism”].
18
Id.; accord DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS 39-40 (1958).
19
Judge Frank Easterbrook, for example, famously complained that it is “difficult, sometimes
impossible, to aggregate [legislators’ preferences] into a coherent collective choice.” Frank H.
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 547-48 (1983); accord Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term—Forward: The Court and the Economic System, 98
HARV. L. REV. 4, 51 (1984) (making the analog point that interest-group bargaining for legislative
outcomes may suffer from an empty core problem); see also Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and
Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry into Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80
GEO. L. J. 1787, 1822 (1992) (using Arrow’s theorem to argue for more robust judicial review).
To the extent this literature counsels for more searching judicial review based on inferences about
legislative incoherence, it suffers from a pervasive nirvana problem because it fails to account for
instability in multimember courts. For a penetrating critique along these lines, see Maxwell L.
Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1225-26 n.18 & 122930 (1994) [hereinafter “Stearns, Misguided Renaissance”]. Similar criticisms were lodged against
the decisions of multi-member courts. Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence
and Its Implications, 63 VA. L. REV. 561, 563 (1977) (“Decision making by multi-judge appellate
courts ... [and other collective decision makers] display[s] features that may make them vulnerable
to similar theoretical criticism [based on social choice].”); see also Lewis A. Kornhauser,
Modeling Collegial Courts. II. Legal Doctrine, 8 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 441 (1992) (identifying
aggregation difficulties as a central problem in the analysis of multimember courts); Lewis A.
Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82 (1986) (same).
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instability in collective choice, such that wholesale skepticism is an unnecessary
response.20
Having demonstrated the utility of an agenda-control lens, I then ask how
successful the Framer’s initial distribution of agenda-setting authorities has been.
The original dispensation of agenda control powers, I argue, has not proved
durable. Rather, agenda-setting powers have diffused across branch boundaries or
from within government to non-state actors. A central change has been a large
shift of decisional authority from Congress to both the executive and (less often
remarked) the judiciary. Building on earlier work about the negotiated character
of interbranch arrangements,21 I contend that derogations from the constitutional
law of agenda control are best explained by the fact that political actors and
branches have traded their original agenda-control authorities. The Constitution,
in effect, has provided a framework for bargaining, not a Procrustean network of
constraints. The ensuing negotiated redistribution of agenda control powers is an
overlooked element of the history of shifting interbranch relations over the past
century. As such, it illuminates the dynamics of constitutional change around the
separation of powers.22
The argument proceeds in three parts. Part I sets the stage by explaining
why agenda control is a consequential margin of constitutional design by mining
on the aforementioned two bodies of political science research. Part II adumbrates
the heterogeneous solutions to the problem of agenda setting found in the original
Constitution, focusing on the separation of powers. It develops a taxonomical
framework for classifying and evaluating agenda control mechanisms. The final
Part then evaluates how the Framers’ choices fared. It demonstrates that branches
have traded agenda-control entitlements in ways that have critically shaped the

20

Another line of legal scholarship attacks the assumptions and definitions of Arrow’s theorem,
and in particular its definition of rationality. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson,
Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2146-58, 2192 (1990); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow's Theorem:
Ordinalism and Republican Government, 75 IOWA L. REV. 949 (1990) (arguing that formal
assumptions of Arrow's Theorem's rarely hold). For an comprehensive response to such criticisms,
see JOHN W. PATTY & ELIZABETH MAGGIE PENN, SOCIAL CHOICE AND LEGITIMACY: THE
POSSIBILITIES OF IMPOSSIBILITY 32-33 (2015).
21
See Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595 (2014)
[hereinafter “Huq, Negotiated Structural Constitution”].
22
This is true in both the separation-of-powers context, see, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise
of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1243 (1994) (pointing to “the demise of the
nondelegation doctrine” and the “death of the Unitary Executive” as motors of change in the
constitutional dispensation); see also Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking As Legislating, 103 GEO. L.J.
1003, 1016 (2015) (characterizing extant constraints on legislative delegation as “toothless”), and
the federalism context, see David S. Rubenstein, The Paradox of Administrative Preemption, 38
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 267, 304 (2015) (“Today, however, the enumerated-powers principle
hardly restrains Congress's substantive power.”).
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historical trajectory of institutional development. It further addresses the
normative question how the ensuing changes should be evaluated.
I.

Agenda Control as an Object of Constitutional Design

Theorists of constitutional design as early as Rousseau have recognized
the importance of agenda control.23 Drawing on that literature, this Part unearths
two general reasons for attending to the question. The first draws on an empirical
literature about the formation of national policy agendas. The second mines social
choice scholarship to show why agenda control is inevitably a part of
constitutional design
A.

The Circumstances of Democratic Choice

Constitutional adjudication is intensely focused on prohibitory effects.
Constitutional design, though, is not solely a matter of constraining the state.
Before constraint, constitutions must articulate basic forms of the state as a
framework for ongoing governance.24 The American iteration is also a “blueprint
for democratic governance.”25 To further this end, the Constitution must account
for how democratic contestation unfurls. In three ways, the quotidian
circumstances of democratic politics create a need for constitutional agendacontrol mechanisms.
First, governments are typically confronted with “a great number of real,
tangible issues” at any one moment, but “can attend to them only one at a time.”26
The first step of democratic choice, therefore, is sorting a subclass of issues to

23

See John T. Scott, Rousseau’s Anti-Agenda-Setting Agenda and Contemporary Democratic
Theory, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 137, 140-41 (2005) (discussing how Rousseau in The Social
Contract envisaged the allocation of power to initiate policy-making to the legislative branch).
Scott’s analysis is a persuasive response to an earlier suggestion that Rousseau allocated agendasetting authority to experts in the government. Ethan Putterman, Rousseau on Agenda-Setting and
Majority-Rule, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 459, 461 (2003) (reading Rousseau as envisaging “expert
agenda setters [who] would advance and enhance citizen participation”).
24
The enabling function of constitutional design is stressed by STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND
CONSTRAINTS: THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 163 (1995) (comparing constitutional rules
to grammatical rules, which “do not merely retrain a speaker” but also “allow interlocutors to do
many thanks they would not otherwise have been able to do or even have thought of doing”).
25
Samuel Issacharoff, The Enabling Role of Democratic Constitutionalism: Fixed Rules and Some
Implications for Contested Presidential Elections, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1985, 1995 (2003) (emphasis
added). Not all constitutions, of course, strive aim toward democratic government. Tom Ginsburg
& Alberto Simpser, Introduction: Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes, in RULE BY LAW: THE
POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 1, 4-5 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds.,
2008) (explaining the function of constitutions in authoritarian regimes).
26
BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 12, at 10.
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consider seriously.27 This entails creation of a “list of subjects or problems to
which governmental officials, and people outside of government closely
associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given
time.” 28 Such lists are not defined by exogenous shocks alone. Even casual
acquaintance with the rhythms of national politics should reveal that the mere fact
that an issue makes headlines—be it drought in the western states, a looming
federal deficit, crime, or immigration surges—does not all suffice to elicit new
legislation or regulation. It requires conscious mobilization, typically by political
elites, to mold crisis into an occasion for state action.29
Second, once an issue advances onto the government’s radar, there are
almost always non-binary choices between paths of state action. For example,
there are often civil and criminal regulatory options. Proposals to criminalize
implicate decisions about how to calibrate a continuous variable of sentence
severity. Noncriminal regulation require choices over forms of regulation (e.g.,
command-and-control vs. market mechanisms), the mix of public and private
enforcement, and the range of legal and equitable remedies. In many domains,
officials face plural, incompatible regulatory approaches. In the healthcare
context, for example, Congress recently had to elect between (among other
options) a Canadian-style single payer system, expansion of employer-based
coverage, or an individual-mandate approach to market correction.30 This need for
agenda-setting between policy options persists through the decision-making
process.
Third, the government’s agenda is typically an object of interest-group
contestation that requires channeling and resolution. Interest groups mobilize to
elevate novel issues onto the government’s agenda and then to frame issues so as
to maximize their comparative advantage,31 and to engage in “negative blocking”
of disfavored issues.32 Interest groups also shape the range of policy options
considered by officials. As the national economy has expanded in complexity,

27

See David A. Rochefort & Robert W. Cobb, Problem Definition, Agenda Access, and Policy
Choice, 21 POL'Y STUD. J. 56, 56 (1993).
28
KINGDON, supra note 12, at 3.
29
See, e.g., BENNETT, supra note 13, at 3. For a brilliant demonstration of this point in the crime
policy context, see Vesla Weaver, Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Criminal
Policy, 21 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 230, 234-36 (2007).
30
Congress was familiar with this range of options. Matthew P. Harrington, Health Care Crimes:
Avoiding Overenforcement, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 111, 111-12 (1994) (describing considerations of
these options during President Clinton’s effort to obtain a new healthcare law during the 103rd
Congress).
31
Olsen’s canonical work on public choice suggests that the efficacy of an interest group is
inversely correlated to its transaction cost of mobilization. OLSEN, supra note 13, at 2.
32
KINGDON, supra note 12, at 46, 48-49 (finding that “interest groups loom very large indeed” in
agenda-setting efforts).
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interest groups have grown in “number and diversity.”33 They increasingly supply
a “legislative subsidy” 34 in the form of policy information, political intelligence,
and legislative labor to strategically selected legislators. This epistemic role
situates interest groups to shape both how issues are defined35 and remedied.36 An
important role of the constitution is channeling and harnessing such activity into
productive legislative form.
B.

Agenda Control as an Equilibrating Mechanism in Collective-Choice
Mechanisms

Social choice theory illuminates a second important justification for
agenda-setting mechanisms in constitutional design. This literature identifies
irreconcilable tensions between demands for coherence and for minimal
democratic credentials in collective-choice mechanisms. It teaches that instability
(or cycling) is imminently possible in all normatively plausible mechanisms for
aggregating inputs from more than two decision-makers over more than two
options, and that an inexorable specter of instability haunts democratic
constitutional design. A constitution’s framers face difficult trade-offs between
the risks of instability in collective outcomes, of strategic voting, and of the abuse
of agenda-control power.
To unpack these basic points, this section briefly sets forth some core
results of social choice theory. First, key technical results—most importantly,
Arrow’s original theorem—are summarized in nontechnical terms. Second, I
elaborate institutional implications of those results, focusing on the role of agenda
control and strategic voting in suppressing instability. Finally, the extent of
federal government action implicating the potential for cycling is mapped.

33

BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 12, at 177.
Richard Hall & Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69,
69-70 (2008). Access to legislators to provide information, however, appears to be a function of
campaign contributions. See Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, Campaign Contributions
Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment, -- AM. J. POL. SCI.
– (forthcoming 2015) (reporting results of a randomized experiment to the effect that campaign
contributions to congressional staff offered access four times more often when contributions were
made than when no contributions were made).
35
See DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING 309 (1997)
(“Political debates on policy issues are often portrayed as a conflict over competing definitions of
a social condition.”). Questions of causation provide an especially fruitful object of interest-group
contestation. Deborah A. Stone, Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas, 104 POL.
SCI. Q. 281, 283 (1989).
36
Cf. BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 12, at 29 (“[M]uch of the policy process is determined
by the artful connection of solutions to problems.”).
34
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1.

Instability and Incoherence in Collective Choice

Consider three individuals (1, 2, and 3) with three options (A, B, and C)
and the following distribution of preferences (where “›” stands for “is preferred
to”):
Table 1: The Condorcet Cycle
Person
1
2
3

Order of Preferences
A›B›C
B›C›A
C›A›B

The three individuals use majority-rule to decide between pairs of options in turn.
In seriatim votes, A beats B, B beats C, and then C beats A. Application of a
majority rule to these options, therefore, generates a series of intransitive
outcomes, or what is termed a Condorcet cycle. 37 In this and many other
collective choice situations, there is also no Condorcet winner: an option that
beats all others in pairwise voting. 38 An examination of Table 1 demonstrates
that any outcome, A, B, or C, can be destabilized by a new majority-rule vote, and
that there will always be someone who stands to gain from seeking that vote. For
example, once C is selected, 1 will request a vote on C versus B. For this reasons,
the results in Table 1 exemplify instability or cycling. Further, the results can also
be labeled incoherent insofar as there seems to be no singular way of translating
underlying individual preferences into a single ‘right’ outcome that represents a
single collective choice.39
Arrow’s theorem implies that “many minimally democratic systems will
in some situation produce an intransitive ordering … similar to [a Condorcet
cycle].”40 As updated in 1963,41 Arrow’s theorem identifies four criteria that a
reasonable mechanism for aggregating individual preferences into a collective
choice should meet. According to Arrow, a reasonable aggregation rule should
meet the following criteria: (1) It should be Pareto efficient, insofar as if every
37

PATTY & PENN, supra note 20, at 13.
Id.
39
Riker identifies a “populist interpretation of voting” to the effect that “the opinion of the people
must be right and must be respected because the will of the people is the liberty of the people.”
RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM, supra note 17, at 14. But, it is hardly clear any theorist
endorses such a view. Joshua Cohen, An Epistemic Conception of Democracy, 97 ETHICS 26, 2728 (1986) (discussing Rousseau’s and Bentham’s views).
40
PATTY & PENN, supra note 20, at 14.
41
The following account draws on the elegant account in Sen and Maskin, supra note 16, at 33-38,
and the more extended and technical treatment in PATTY & PENN, supra note 20, at 20-69
(explaining theorem and offered extended defenses of each condition). The version of the theorem
set forth here was first developed in ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE, supra note 15, at 22-33.
38

11

individual prefers A to B, A should prevail. (2) It should satisfy the independence
of irrelevant alternatives condition: when ranking two alternatives, A and B,
preferences over C should not influence the result of the aggregation
mechanism.42 (3) It should be transitive, i.e., it should produce an unambiguous
winner or collection of winners. 43 (4) It should be non-dictatorial, in that it
responds to the preferences of more than one person. The nub of Arrow’s result is
that there is no aggregation rule—not majority rule, supermajority rules, plurality
vote rules, Borda count, and not the market44—that consistently satisfies all these
conditions. To generate coherent outputs across all cases, the Arrow theorem
holds, the mechanism must give way along one of these four margins.
Subsequent theoretical work extends and refines this basic result. For
example, later studies examined the possibility of cycling under majority rule.45
Building on Arrow’s initial result, Plott and others demonstrated that a majority
vote rule will generate transitive outputs in only a limited set of cases.46 Another
vein of theoretical work, developed by Gibbard and Satterthwaite, examined the
tendency of preference aggregation mechanisms to elicit strategic or insincere
behavior. They demonstrated that every nontrivial preference mechanism (except
for a dictator) can elicit strategic voting from participants.47 Finally, McKelvey
demonstrated that when a preference aggregation mechanism engenders potential
voting cycles, there is always an agenda that, once chosen, will lead to the choice
of any possible policy alternative within the space of options under

42

Lest this sound arcane, consider the use of plurality vote rule in presidential elections, where the
choice between two main party candidates A and B can be altered by the presence of a ‘spoiler’
third candidate C . “The independence axiom serves to rule out spoilers.” SEN AND MASKIN, supra
note 16, at 48.
43
In Sen and Maskin, the third criterion is “unrestricted domain,” which requires that “[f]or any
logically possible set of preferences, there is a social ordering R.” Id. at 34. This emphasizes the
fact that the aggregation rule cannot ex ante rule out by fiat a subset of alternative options as a way
of generating intransitivity.
44
See Saul Levmore, Public Choice Defended, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 777, 781 n.17 (2005).
45
There are plenty of reasons for endorsing majority rule as a desirable aggregation rule. Kenneth
O. May, A Set of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision, 20
ECONOMETRICA 680 (1952).
46
A majority vote rule generates stable outputs when there is only one issue to decide, where
preferences or interests are similar or nearly unanimous, and where preferences are delicately
balanced against each other. William H. Riker & Barry Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of
Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L.
REV. 373, 382 (1988); see also Charles Plott, A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under
Majority Rule, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 787 (1967).
47
Allen Gibbard, Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, 41 ECONOMETRICA 587,
587 (1973) (asserting that any nondictatorial voting scheme with at least three possible outcomes
is subject to individual manipulation); Mark A. Satterthwaite, Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's
Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare
Functions, 10 J. ECON. THEORY 187, 193, 192-202 (1975).
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consideration.48 In later work, McKelvey identified distributions of preferences
and voting rules for which the possibility of cycling (and, hence, of manipulation
by agenda control) is relatively low.49 These results illustrate that allocations of
agenda-control power dramatically change the stability, coherence, and
substances of outputs from collective choice mechanisms.
Neither Arrow’s theorem nor its extensions are empirical in nature. They
do not predict the frequency of instability under any given decision rule.50 There
is vigorous, ongoing debate about how often either Cordorcetian cycling or other
forms of instability are observed in the real-world political institutions.51 There is
also disagreement as to whether the formal possibility of strategic voting under a
given aggregation mechanism will necessarily imply the observed fact of strategic
voting. 52 Nevertheless, an observed absence of instability (in the form of
Condorcet cycles) or strategic action (whether by an agenda setter or voters) does
not mean an aggregation rule is invulnerable to incoherence or instability
critiques. In part, this is because instability might not arise due to the exercise of a
strategic agenda control (as McKelvey shows) strategic voting (as Gibbard and
Satterthwaite predict).
From the perspective of the constitutional framer, social-choice theoretical
results have bite regardless of instability’s empirical frequency. Typically, those
who design a constitution strive to create an enduring document, not one good for

48

Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multi-Dimensional Voting Models and Some
Implications for Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472 (1976) (demonstrating that “where all
voters evaluate policy in terms of Euclidean metric, if there is no equilibrium outcome ... it is
theoretically possible to design voting procedures which, starting from any given point, will end
up at any other point in the space of alternatives”); RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM, supra
note 17, at 187 (providing a summary of McKelvey’s result).
49
Richard D. McKelvey, Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice,
18 Am. J. POL. SCI. 283, 283 (1986); see also Norman Schofield et al., The Core and the Stability
of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 195, 207-08 (1988).
50
Riker & Weingast, supra note 48, at 382 (“Arrow's Theorem is a possibility theorem. It says
only that an event can occur, not that it will occur or has often occurred.”)
51
Compare id. at 388-93 (providing examples from congressional debates); with GERRY MACKIE,
DEMOCRACY DEFENDED (2003) (rejecting examples).
52
SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE, supra note 14, at 195 (arguing that in many democratic choice
situations, people are “guided not so much by maximization of expected utility, but something
much simpler, viz, just a desire to record one’s true preference”). Elsewhere, Sen develops the
concept of a commitment, defined “in terms of a person choosing an act that he believes will yield
a lower level of personal welfare to him than an alternative that is available to him,” as an
explanation for the refusal to engage in strategic voting. Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A
Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 327
(1977). For another skeptical view of the relevance of the Gibbard-Sattherthwaite and McKelvey
results, see Bernard Grofman, Public Choice, Civil Republicanism, and American Politics:
Perspectives of A "Reasonable Choice" Modeler, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1541, 1554 (1993).
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a single ride.53 This requires a collective choice mechanism that works with many
different permutations of popular preferences. The constitutional designer thus
cannot assume that the distribution of preferences will be such that instability and
incoherence will not be concerns.
2.

Institutional Responses to Instability in Collective Choice: Agenda
Control and Strategic Voting

A central implication of Arrow’s theorem for constitutional design is that
that task must begin by “identifying which assumption(s) is relaxed for each
institution” and then to proceed by “comparing the ability of a given institution to
which collective decision-making responsibility has been assigned under the
Constitution to issue a rational collective design.”54 That any method of collective
choice will fall short of meeting all four of Arrow’s conditions means that
comparative judgments are in practice inevitable.
There are, roughly speaking, three general categories of responses to
instability in collective-choice mechanisms. I set these out, but must stress at the
outset that this Article is focused on the third response. First, a designer might
tolerate a certain degree of instability within a preference aggregation system.
This might be justified on pluralist grounds as “provid[ing] a way to avoid
rejecting some fundamental values in situations when not all can be satisfied at
once.” 55 Second, certain collective choice mechanisms do not allow cycling
because they stipulate a fixed number of ‘rounds’ of voting. Such mechanisms do,
however, invite strategic voting. The plurality voting rule used in presidential
elections, for example, will often mean that “supporters of third parties vote for
their second choice in order to defeat the major party candidate they like the
least.”56 The Gibbard-Satterthwaite result suggests that the institutional design
question is less whether to allow strategic voting—its possibility is endemic—but,
rather, whether to adopt measures to dampen, if not eliminate, it.
The third possibility—which most concerns me here—is that a designer
will arrange a collective choice mechanism to allocate agenda control among
institutional players in some stable and regular way. Institutional designers, as
Shepsle and Weingast observe, can strive for “structure-induced equilibrium” by
53

But perhaps this is a mistake: The average duration of a constitution, however, is only seventeen
years. ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS 120 (2009). The U.S. Constitution is an outlier. Id. at 101.
54
Stearns, Misguided Renaissance, supra note 19, at 1232; see also Saul Levmore, From Cynicism
to Positive Theory in Public Choice, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 375 (2002) (noting that the
takeaway of aggregation paradoxes for legal theorists need not be skepticism, but rather conduce
to “the study of how we do the best we can in the face of difficulties”).
55
Pildes & Anderson, supra note 20, at 2171-72.
56
RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM, supra note 17, at 145-51.
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carefully channeling “the sometimes subtle influence provided by control over
structure and procedure.”57 Conscious allocation of agenda control power to one
or another institution justified because it should elicit regularity and stability in
state action.58
What does it mean to assign agenda control to a given actor? The socialchoice literature suggests this term has a capacious meaning. At a minimum, it
captures a class of cases in which collective choice is required to begin or end
with certain steps, and where the structure of a multi-stage aggregation rule
determines outcomes.59 But it sweeps more broadly than this. Riker commented
on the “significance, variety and pervasiveness” of agenda-setting devices.60 They
include powers to initiate policy-making, to veto proposals, to identify
policymakers, to resolve ambiguities in extant policies, and to determine who may
offer proposals. Consistent with this view, I develop in Part II.A a capacious
account of agenda-control devices within the Constitution.
In sum, I draw a rather different lesson for institutional design from the
social choice literature choice from earlier scholars. The finding of Arrovian
instability has transfixed legal scholars, motivating coruscating critiques of both
legislative and multimember courts’ decisions. Skepticism, though, is not a
necessary inference from social choice theory.61 Although its core results cast
57

Kenneth A. Shepsle, Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach, 1
J. THEORETICAL POL. 131, 136-37 (1989) (“[A] structure induced equilibrium may be defined as
an alternative … that is invulnerable in the sense that no other alternative, allowed by the rules of
procedure, is preferred by all individuals, structural units, and coalitions that possess distinctive
veto or voting power”); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Structure-induced Equilibrium
and Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503. 507-14 (1981) (analyzing a series of equilibriuminducing institutional design options).
58
Accord William H. Riker, Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study
of Institutions, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 432, 443 ((1980); see also Terry M. Moe, Political
Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 213, 216 (1990) (“Politics is
stable because of the distinctive role that institutions play,” in particular in determining ex ante
“what alternatives get considered, in what order, and by whom.”).
59
See ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 43-46 (2000) (describing the process in
which agenda setting chooses outcomes); accord Grant M. Hayden, Note, Some Implications of
Arrow's Theorem for Voting Rights, 47 STAN. L. REV. 295, 299 (1995) (suggesting that
intransitivity leads to dictatorial power being exercised in a social choice function by agenda
setters).
60
RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM, supra note --, at 169.
61
In a much cited piece, Richard Pildes and Elizabeth Anderson treat Arrow’s theorem as a threat
to the normative force of democracy, but respond that “because the values people care about in
individual choice and democratic politics are plural and often incommensurable, those values
cannot be expressed adequately through consistent preference rankings over outcomes described
in the sparse terms available to social choice theory.” Pildes & Anderson, supra note 20, at 2142;
id. at 2160-61 (giving an example of inconsistent individual preferences); see also id. at 2186
(identifying as their target “the claim that social choice theory ‘proves’ that democratic systems
cannot be rationally responsive to citizens' desires, values, and interests”). Aggregation, on this
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doubt on the possibility of identifying in all cases a single outcome as the unique
product of collective choice, Arrow’s theorem hardly implies that democratic
institutional design is a fool’s errand. There is no need to assume that a unique
collective choice, as opposed to a “set of acceptable outcomes,” exists, and
Arrow’s theorem suggests that an aggregation mechanism that can provide at least
some evidence of individuals’ summed judgments is of passable utility.62 With
this weaker ambition in hand, one of many aggregation rules that operate as
“pretty good truth tracker[s]” may suffice.63
*

*

*

This Part has identified two reasons why a constitution must address
agenda control. First, the circumstances of democratic politics in an extended,
heterogeneous republic present state actors with many more potential objects of
regulation than can feasibly be tacked at a single time. Exogenous shocks alone
do not establish priorities, and capacity constraints mean there is a need to

account, is an incomplete method for realizing democratic choice. Id. This is a “narrow” view of
social choice theory’s implications. PATTY & PENN, supra note 20, at 32-33 (faulting Pildes and
Anderson for insisting on the need for social norms and institutional rules, while simultaneously
“miss[ing] the crucial point: [Arrow’s and subsequent] results … indicate why … norms, rules,
and practices are required to produce meaningful and coherent democratic outcomes”). Of note
here, Pildes and Anderson do not categorically deny the need for some form of aggregation
mechanism in a democratic polity. To the contrary, the recognize that social choice theory can
help isolate some of the trade-offs implicit in democratic institutional design. Pildes & Anderson,
supra note 20, at 2196-97 (recognizing that sometimes “agenda-setting elites” exist, and the
relevant normative question “whether the [agenda control] power is managed, distributed, or
contained in ways that over time further democratic values”). They do not, however, pursue in
detail the range of institutional responses resolving trade-offs generated in the design of collective
choice mechanisms.
62
Jules Coleman & John Ferejohn, Democracy and Social Choice, 97 ETHICS 6, 15-17 (1986)
(developing, in response to Riker, a series of defenses of the meaningfulness of collective choice
given Arrow’s theorem); see also Pildes & Anderson, supra note 20, at 2187 (rejecting
consistency as a criteria of rationality).
63
Gerry Mackie, The reception of social choice theory by democratic theory, in MAJORITY
DECISIONS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 77, 89 (Stéphanie Novak & Jon Elster eds. 2014). A more
recent effort to define a nonempty class of legitimate choice procedures, developed by John Patty
and Elizabeth Penn, focuses on internal consistency and stability of that mechanism. On their
view, internal stability requires (1) sensibility of outcome—i.e. “no alternative in the sequence of
considered alternatives is strictly superior to the final choice”; and (2) sequence coherence—that
the “order of decision-making not contradict the presumption that reasoning was guided by the
underlying principle”; and (3) stability, which “implies that inclusion of any alternative in the
decision sequence would either introduce a policy that is incomparable to the final policy choice
or violate internal consistency.” PATTY & PENN, supra note 20, at 91-103. They demonstrate that
“the set of legitimate choices is always well defined and non empty.” Id. at 119. Although I do not
apply their notion of legitimate choice here—which does not plainly fit any constitutional
mechanism—Patty and Penn’s work demonstrates how social choice theory can accommodate
normative theories that distinguish desirable from undesirable decision rules.
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integrate some kind of agenda-setting mechanism into the fabric of national
policy-making institutions.
Second, even once an issue has been identified as appropriate for
regulation, any collective state actor confronts a cluster of difficulties in reaching
decisions. The social choice literature points toward a need for constitutional
structures that induce equilibrium. It demonstrates that the design of collective
choice mechanisms necessitates a trade-off between different goals, in particular
the nondictatorship and unrestricted domain conditions. Agenda control
mechanisms, moreover, come in different flavors. Different circumstances may
warrant different solutions. A fair implication of the social choice literature,
therefore, is that a constitutional designer must exercise a measure of judgment
over which agenda control mechanisms to uses.
II.

Agenda Control Mechanisms in Constitutional Law

This Part develops an account of agenda control mechanisms originally to
be found in the Constitution. I begin by offering a working definition of ‘agenda
control’ tailored to constitutional analysis. I then identify agenda-setting rules in
the original constitutional text. My focus here is on interbranch relations, where
problems of agenda control loom large and where the Framers’ design choices can
be picked out with greatest perspicuity. That is not to say that agenda control does
not emerge as a design choice elsewhere in constitutional law; it is simply that the
separation of powers context is one in which problem of agenda control loom
prominently.64
64

Consider, for example, federalism. On the one hand, collective state action via treaty is
prohibited. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §10, cl. 1. This means that states do not need a mechanism to
resolve agenda control problems in the mine run of things. Nevertheless, states have developed a
suite of subconstitutional organizations, such as associations, to engage in collective action. See
Aziz Z. Huq, Does the Logic of Collective Action Explain Federalism Doctrine?, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 217, 288-92 (2014) (documenting informal solutions to facilitate states’ collective action).
Article V, moreover, anticipates two forms of supermajoritarian state action to propose and ratify
amendments. It is possible to imagine cycles emerging in the ratification process is states were
able to first ratify and then rescind their acquiescence to an amendment. States’ power to rescind is
unclear. On the one hand, judicial precedent sparked by Kansas’s attempted rescission of the child
labor amendment suggests withdrawal is impermissible. See Coleman v. Miller, 146 Kan. 390,
400-03, 71 P.2d 518, 524-26 (1937), aff'd on other grounds, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). On the other
hand, the 1924 Wadsworth-Garrett proposal to amend Article V would have provided that “until
three-fourths of the States have ratified or more than one-fourth of the States have rejected or
defeated a proposed amendment, any State may change its vote.” 65 Cong. Rec. 4492-93 (1924);
66 Cong. Rec. 2159 (1925). A rule against rescission of a ratification might be justified as a
solution to Arrovian instability, at the cost of making amendments harder to enact. Given the
difficulty of changing the constitutional text at present, the latter’s marginal cost may though be
minimal. Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, The Function of Article V, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1165 (2014). A
discussion of agenda choice mechanisms in the federalism context, in short, would not want for
richness.
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A.

A Definition of Agenda Control

The term ‘agenda control’ is widely used in both the policy-making
literature and the social choice literature. Nevertheless, it does not have a clear
definition upon which all converge. Instead, a working definition for
constitutional analysis must be stitched together from hints, allusions, and theories
across both the political science and the legal scholarship.
To begin, scholars working in the empirical political science literature on
continuity and change in national policy-making treat policy agendas as the
product of plural social forces, including interest groups, media, as well as official
actors.65 This literature is not focused on questions of institutional design or legal
rules, and hence has no need for precise identification of the institutional forms of
agenda control. In contrast, the social choice literature is centrally concerned with
the design of aggregation mechanisms such as elections, legislative processes, or
adjudication. Nevertheless, a clear definition of agenda control does not emerge
from the social choice literature either. Although Riker points to examples such as
legislative leadership’s ability to “select alternatives among with decisions will be
made, and … procedures for coming to a choice,” 66 he does not provide a
comprehensive definition.
More usefully, Patty and Penn define “the agenda” as the act of
“constructing the decision sequence [of options and expressions of preferences
through voting or otherwise].”67 They further observe that “a common thread
among political institution” is that powers of “proposing, shepherding, and
defending potential policy choices [are] generally explicitly assigned to one or
more individuals.”68 Their analysis suggests that the notion of agenda control
encompasses control not just of a starting point for deliberation, but also the
length, structure and composition of its sequence.69 Consistent with this approach,
Levine and Plott posit that an agenda has two functions: “it limits the information
65

See KINGDON, supra note 12, at 20 (including interest groups, legislative coalitions, the
administration, and the “national mood” as causal forces in agenda creation); BAUMGARTNER &
JONES, supra note 12, at 59-82, 175-92 (documenting the roles of a similarly variegated set of
actors and social forces).
66
RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM, supra note 17, at 169; id. at 173-4 (supplying the
example of Pliny the Younger’s control of the structure of voting in the Roman Senate).
67
PATTY & PENN, supra note 20, at 93; see also Pildes & Anderson, supra note 20, at 2195 n.187
(refraining from giving a definition of agenda control, but intimating that it includes” establishing
sequences of decisions”). For other discussions of agenda control that focus on sequence alone,
see Levine & Plott, supra note 19, at 564;
68
PATTY & PENN, supra note 20, at 125.
69
This is consistent with Banks’s definition of an agenda as “a means of facilitating the decision
problem of voters when faced with a set of alternatives … an ordering of alternatives from which
pairwise comparisons may be made.” J.S. Banks, Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and Agenda
Control, 1 SOC. CHOICE 295, 295 (1985).
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available to individual decision-makers” and “determines the set of strategies
available.” 70 Similarly, Stearns observes that agenda-setting powers include
timing-related powers to set “[d]eadlines and limitations on reconsideration.”71
Consistent with these approaches, the following definition of agenda
control power provides a starting point for the analysis of constitutional rules. A
constitutional agenda-setting rule is one (1) found in constitutional text or
jurisprudence that (2) vests an office, person, or organization, explicitly or
implicitly, with authority to define the persons involved in, or the substantive
scope, timing, voting rule, or sequencing of a decision-making process that can
generate a legal rule or other outcome with the force and effect of law. More
informally, agenda-setting rules concern the who and the how of state power, not
questions of what may be done.
Because it does not include boundary-setting rules on the reach of state
power, this definition of agenda-setting rules marks out a species of constitutional
question distinct and separate from the modal puzzles of constitutional law.72 It
also distinguishes the constitutional law of agenda-setting from a related, but nonconstitutional, body of congressional procedures for organizing the internal
legislative process. Legislative procedures, which are endogenously produced by
each chamber, 73 assign agenda-setting authority among various members of
Congress to important effect. Although the Constitution licenses such rules—

70

Levine & Plott, supra note 19, at 564-65.
Stearns, Misguided Renaissance, supra note 19, at 1273; see also Mattias K. Polborn & Gerald
Willman, Optimal Agenda-setter timing, 42 CANADIAN J. ECON. 1527, 1536 (2009) (modeling
agenda-setting in a committee context, and demonstrating that part of the value of agenda-setting
is the power to alter the timing a decision in ways that increase or decrease the option value of
learning more about a policy on the part of other participants).
72
I also exclude a wide range of other kinds of rules found in the Constitution. These include, for
example the selection of officials, see, e.g., U.S. CONST., Art I, §§2 & 5 (selection rules for
representatives and senators), the punishment of officials, Art I, § 2, cl. 4 & § 3, cl. 6
(impeachment), or textual amendment of the Constitution, Art. V, among other matters. Agenda
control questions do, nevertheless, arise in respect to these provisions. Consider, for example the
sequence of action envisaged by the impeachment clauses, with the House first voting articles of
impeachment, and then the Senate trying those articles alone. In the mine run of things, this likely
means the Senate’s preferences operate as a constraint on the House, for a House focused on
impeachment will necessarily anticipate the likely preferences of the Senate in crafting
impeachment articles. On the other hand, however, the House’s power to determine the scope of
articles allows it to craft grounds for impeachment that either place the Senate under great political
pressure to convict, or that render it difficult to convict but politically costly to acquit. The House,
in this way, has the power to create tensions between legal and political imperatives for the Senate.
The agenda-setting regime over impeachment, in order words, has complex distributive effects as
between the two chambers of Congress.
73
The Constitution requires as much. U.S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl 2 (“Each House may determine the
Rules of its Proceedings ….”).
71
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allocating their authorship to distinct chambers—I keep the specific content of
those rules largely outside this analysis so as to keep my project tractable.74
B.

The Agenda Control Powers of Congress

This section identifies a series of mechanisms in Article I and beyond that
stabilize legislative outcomes, and in doing so, parcel out authority to select some
issues rather than others for governmental attention. Solving Congress’s socialchoice problem, that is, simultaneously determines which governmental actors
have power to set the public policy agenda.
The Constitution disperses lawmaking power between two houses of
Congress and the president by assigning different agenda control powers to
different institutional actors. One example of an agenda-setting power, found in
the Origination Clause of Article I, Section 7, Clause 1, is the House’s authority
to initiate the legislative process on fiscal matters.75 Another is embodied in the
subsequent clause, which describes a sequence of lawmaking involving two-house
passage, presidential consideration and potential White House veto, and finally, a
super-majoritarian override procedure.76 While neither the second house nor the
president directly determine the metes and bounds of a legislative proposal, their
exercise of a “veto power”77 necessarily shapes the contents of threshold bill
proposals: the proposing chamber seeking to enact a bill into law will rationally
anticipate and shape a measure in conformity to the expected preferences of
subsequent veto players. 78 Divergences in the preferences of the pivotal
institutional actors impede enactment of any new law,79 narrowing the space of
enactable legislative proposals.
This basic structure of legislative choice in the federal government
embodies a complex, Burkian solution to social choice problems. Three design
choices are worth isolating and analyzing as forms of agenda-setting embedded
74

Cf. Vermeule, supra note 11, at 362 (“Methodologically, it is impossible to talk fruitfully about
the design of constitutional rules if everything is up for grabs all at once ….”). For an analysis of
congressional procedures though a social choice theory lens, see Saul Levmore, Parliamentary
Law, Majority Decision Making, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV. 971 (1989) [hereinafter
“Levmore, Parliamentary Law”].
75
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 1 (“All Bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.:)
76
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2.
77
CHARLES CAMERON, VETO BARGAINING: PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF NEGATIVE POWER
46 (2000).
78
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 11, at 529-33 (modeling bicameralism and presentment as a
sequential game with perfect information). For a similar model under a different label of “pivotal
politics,” see KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF LAWMAKING 21-28 (1998).
79
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 11, at 532 (“The Framers expected the House, Senate, and
President to have widely dispersed preferences about the status quo, and therefore the no-statute
game (Case 2) was most likely in the short term.”).
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within constitutional text and jurisprudence. Attention to the agenda-setting
function of these elements of the Constitution, I endeavor to show, surfaces
consequences and internal conflicts that would otherwise go unobserved.
1.

Bicameralism and Presentment

It is useful to begin with the most facially prominent agenda-setting
element of Article I: the requirement that the House, the Senate, and the President
(almost always) all concur in a bill before it becomes law. By requiring
concurrence from several veto players across both Houses and the presidency,
bicameralism and presentment dramatically narrows the domain of plausible
legislative proposals.80 That space, in expectation, will be smaller than the space
of enactable policy preferences turning on either a pair’s or a single actor’s
preferences.
This choice-constraining effect of the concurrence demands of
bicameralism and presentment is a first agenda-shaping solution to Arrovian
instability. In an influential treatment of structure-induced equilibrium, Shepsle
and Weingast observed that “institutional restrictions on the domain of exchange
[can] induce stability,” albeit at the cost of violating Arrow’s unrestricted domain
condition.81 The resulting set of options is also likely to be “value-restricted” (i.e.
there is some option never ranked as either best, worst, or medium by any veto
player) and thus coherent.82 The structure of veto-gates in the legislative process,
in short, mitigates the risk of uncertainty by easing one of the four Arrovian
criteria (unrestricted domain). It does so, moreover, without making the House,
the Senate, or the President a ‘dictator’ in the sense of having unfettered, or
largely unfettered, control over the shape of legislative outputs. To the contrary,
bicameralism may diffuse agenda-setting power since “one chamber’s agenda
setter will be at the mercy of the order of consideration in the other chamber.”83
The bicameralism element of Article I, in short, combines with presentment to
solve a social choice problem, but at the same time to advance another central

80

This is prior, indeed, to the introduction of congressional committees and judicial review into
the model—new features that reduce the domain of plausible enactments even further. Eskridge &
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goal of the Constitution’s separation of powers—the diffusion of political power
between different elected bodies.84
Design solutions often have costs. The concurrence demands of
bicameralism and presentment are no exception. It is by now familiar observation
that plural veto-gates “often” yield gridlock.85 Gridlock, in turn, constitutes a
heavy thumb on the scale in favor of the status quo. 86 This is normatively
attractive if new lawmaking is presumptively suspicious, and the status quo ante
to law-making always desirable. For example, if the background to federal
legislation were a just prepolitical distribution of property rights at risk of
inequitable corruption by meddling legislative majorities,87 a structure-induced
equilibrium that favored the status quo might be normative desirable. Such a
presumption about the baseline distribution of property entitlements, however
imaginable at the time of the Founding, is plainly implausible now.88 The status
quo that contemporary legislative coalitions stand to displace is not well described
as a tabla rasa. It is rather a complex accumulation of previous legislation,
agency interpretations, presidential unilateralism, and unexpected interactions
between the multiplicity of regulatory regimes found in the U.S. Code and state
statute books.89 Thus, the status quo that bicameralism and presentment shields
might embody background distributions of individual entitlements, the outcomes
84

For a typical statement to this effect, see, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle
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provisions). In one case, the Constitution itself imposes a sunset rule in respect to military
expenditures. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (two-year limit on military appropriations).
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of long and unintended policy drift, or even executive branch adventurism.90 A
bias in favor of such a baseline has only a thin intrinsic normative justification.91
This agenda-setting structure has motivated legal disputes when Congress
has tried to require the concurrence of additional actors. The Court, however, has
resisted some deviations from the “finely wrought” pathway of Article I, Section
7.92 In the mid-1980s and 1990s, the Court invalidated three different legislative
efforts to supplement Article I, Section 7 with, a legislative veto exercised by a
subset of Congress93; a budgetary mechanism designed to mechanically trim
deficit spending via automatic fiscal ‘haircuts,’94 and a presidential line-item veto
again designed to keep budgets in check.95 In each of these cases, the Court read
the text of the Constitution to establish “a single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedure.” 96 The Court’s text-based argument in favor of the
exclusivity in these cases, however, is unpersuasive. To begin with, notice that in
many other instances the Court has declined to read the Constitution’s text as
exhaustive in a similar fashion. The application of the First Amendment to
executive as well as legislative action, the efflorescence of state sovereign
immunity doctrines—these are merely the immediately obvious examples.
Further, the “perception of [textual] clarity or ambiguity is itself often affected by
interpretive considerations that are commonly thought to be extra-textual [and] is
partly constructed in American interpretive practice.”97 To conclude that a legal
text should be read as exclusive or exemplary, one needs some other evidence,
whether gleaned from structure, history, or a prior understandings of the text’s
purpose. The Court’s precedent treating Article I, Section 7 as exclusive begs the
question whether the normative justifications for bicameralism and presentment
justify that result—a question I return to in Part III.
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2.

Bespoke Starting Rules for Legislation

A second sort of solution to social choice dynamics concerns the power to
start certain kinds of legislative process as opposed to the series of required
concurrence from various actors. There are three elements of Article 1, Section 7
bearing this function.
First, Article 1, Section 7 regimes makes the House the first mover on
“[a]ll Bills for raising revenue”98 as a means of vesting the power of the purse
with the more popular branch of the legislature.99 That clause also preserves the
Senate’s power “to propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.”100 The
primary method of enforcing the Origination Clause is the House’s “blue slip”
procedure for returning Senate-passed revenue bills to the other house.101 Judicial
enforcement is available, but rarely invoked. 102 The Court has permitted the
Senate to exercise an expansive amendment power by suggesting that the
judiciary lacks power “to determine whether the amendment was or was not
outside the purposes of the original bill.”103 This construction of the Senate’s
authority is consonant with debates at the Philadelphia Convention, during which
delegates considered and rejected the longstanding English rule that would have
rendered a lower house’s fiscal proposals amendment-proof.104
Second, in contrast to the Origination Clause, the starting power for
treaties resides outside Congress in the President. 105 Only the president can
negotiate with another sovereign nation; indeed, only the president can formally
communicate with another nation for the purpose of entering into a treaty.106
Third, and perhaps less noticed, the veto override provision in Article 1,
Section 7, Clause 2, also contains a starting rule. It requires that “the House in
98
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which [a bill] shall have originated” vote first on a veto override.107 This role has
entered constitutional law only obliquely as a means of glossing a separate
constitutional rule. In the Supreme Court’s 1929 Pocket Veto Cases, the Court
relied on the fact that “the House in which the bill originated is not in session” in
the case at hand to construe the President’s pocket veto authority in relatively
capacious terms.108
At least at first blush, these three starting rules seem to allocate significant
agenda-setting authority. Without the consent of a relevant gatekeeper, it would
seem, no proposal can even embark on its legislative voyage let alone reach safe
anchor in the U.S. Code. Whether these provisions have indeed had such a
decisive effect is a question I take up in Part III.
3.

The Equilibrating Role of Political Parties

A final source of structure-induced equilibrium in legislative outcomes
can be rooted in constitutional jurisprudence, but not constitutional text. At least
formally, Article I neither restricts the range of proposals that can be introduced
within the congressional process nor elicits any particular pattern of voting.109
Nevertheless, congressional preferences are distributed in a monotonic (i.e. a
single-peaked) pattern. Empirical studies of the second half of the twentieth
century find that a single dimension of ideological difference explains more than
eighty-five percent of congressional voting.110 Polarization along this axis has
increased since 2000. 111 Monotonicity in Congress reduces the likelihood of
cycling, although it does not eliminate it entirely.112
The existence of monotonic congressional preferences suggests that the
search for legislative stability can be usefully extended before the proposal of a
107
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bill in the House or Senate. 113 One plausible source of monotonicity in
congressional preferences (as distinct from the general public’s preferences) is the
binary structure of the national party system.114 A two-party system tends to
produce policy debates with a binary structure. The existence of only two parties,
rather than the more crowded party systems observed in other democracies, flows
in turn from two elements of the constitutional dispensation. First, it is a function
of a single-district electoral framework since the Founding. Famously, Duverger’s
law predicts that a simple-majority single-ballot electoral system is very likely to
produce a binary party system.115 This framework, though, is only partially a
constitutional choice. At the federal level, it is necessitated solely in the postSeventeenth Amendment Senate.116 Notwithstanding its longstanding use, it is not
required for the House of Representatives, which—except in states with only one
congressional district—can be elected via multi-member districts.117
Second, notwithstanding the flexibility embedded in constitutional
districting rules, the Court has identified the preservation of a two-party system as
a state interest that licenses harsh restrictions on third parties’ access to the
ballot.118 The Court’s logic relied here (in a markedly circular fashion) on a worry
about “party-splintering and excessive factionalism,”119 and has been subject to
much criticism as a result.120 The Court, however, missed a chance to justify its
protection of the national two-party systems by invoking the party duopoly’s
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tendency to induce monotonic legislative preferences. 121 Stability of a social
choice flavor, therefore, might be invoked to underwrite constitutional solicitude
for the two-party system. That stability, moreover, may not emerge if alternative
modalities of political choice were adopted in lieu of a two-party duopoly. In
response, the critics of the party duopoly’s constitutional status might point to the
interaction between the party system and bicameralism. During periods of
interparty polarization, where the gap between the median member of each party
is large, it will be much more difficult to locate legislation that can survive every
veto-gate created by Article I, Section 7. Over the past three decades, legislative
inaction has increased in lockstep with increasing party polarization.122 Stalemate,
that is, flows from the interaction of two stability-inducing structures: our twoparty duopoly characterized by ideologically distinct options and the thicket of
concurrence rules populating Article I, Section 7. These interactions, which
conduce to a supernumerary degree of stability, may justify loosening either one
of the two design margins.
Although my focus here is the separation of powers, it is worth noting in
passing that the choice between party-based and popular agenda-setting
instruments also arises at the state level, in part because institutional
experimentation is more readily feasible than at the federal level. Among the
states, the popular initiative process has been used as a workaround of an
entrenched party system.123 Whether this workaround has provided successful is
the object of debate.124 Most recently, the choice between party-based and popular
agenda control was starkly at issue in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission [“ARIC”], which formally concerned
Arizona’s allocation of redistricting authority to an independent commission.125
That commission was formed to “en[d] the practice of gerrymandering and
121
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improving voter and candidate participation in elections” by moving the starting
power in redistricting matters out of legislative hands into putatively more
independent hands.126 ARIC illustrates how agenda setting can emerge in the
federalism as well as the separation of powers context because of elements the
federal constitutional order that seem to distinguish between different institutions
within a state.
C.

Agenda Control within the Executive Branch

This section first explores two ways in which the Constitution parcels out
agenda-control power between Article I and II, in regard first to policy-making
and then to appointments. As a way of showing the analytic traction obtained by
the agenda-control lens, I further analyze internal executive-branch organization,
especially the creation of multimember agencies, in terms of agenda-setting
problematics.
1.

Starting Rules and the Executive

In most domains where the Constitution divides authority between the
executive and Congress, Congress has the “exclusive” starting power as a matter
of course.127 As Justice Black stated in his Youngstown plurality opinion, “[i]n
the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”128 The necessity
for and temporal “primacy of the Article I lawmaking process”129 over executive
action is implicit in Article II’s command that the president “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.”130 The Youngstown case itself, which is a bedrock
of contemporary separation of powers jurisprudence, is often taken to stand for
the proposition that “the President not only cannot act contra legem, he or she
must point to affirmative legislative authorization when so acting.”131
Congressional starting power is underscored and reinforced in three
different ways in the Constitution’s text and case-law. First, specific elements of
126
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the Constitution’s text reiterate the primacy of congressional action. The Declare
War Clause,132 for example, appears to repose in Congress the power to initiate
armed hostilities and then to regulate comprehensively their execution, 133
although it is generally believed that the Framers intended the presidency to have
power to “repel sudden attacks” on its own initiative.134 Notwithstanding this
exception, there is “no mistaking … the Constitution's broad textual commitment
to Congress's key role in the war-making system.”135
Second, the Court has developed lines of jurisprudence to preserve, to
greater or lesser extents, legislative primacy in determining the content of federal
policy. The more successful judicial intervention—perhaps so successful that it
has now been largely forgotten—concerns the criminal law. Article I does not
mention a specific congressional power to criminalize quotidian matters. 136
Nevertheless, it seems obvious that the federal government has the power to
impose criminal punishment, and yet that the executive has no power to initiate a
criminal prosecution in the absence of a legislative authority. At the time of the
Founding, however, a federal prosecutor or judge could rely on a common law of
crimes.137 The executive’s ability to rely on a repository of common law offenses
invested it with a sort of starting power in respect to the criminal law. It was only
in 1812 that the Supreme Court rejected that inheritance of common-law criminal
offenses from colonial practice. 138 Extinguishing the federal common law of

132

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (“The Congress shall have Power to ... declare War ....”).
Although there is some controversy on this point, the best historical accounts stress the
pervasive extent of congressional authority. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb - A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 947
(2008) (“Congress has been an active participant in setting the terms of battle (and the conduct and
organization of the armed forces and militia more generally”); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The
Sweeping Domestic War Powers of Congress, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1340 (2015) (making a
“case for expansive congressional power “ in respect to “domestic wars”).
134
See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 475-77
(Norton 1966) (1840); see also Raoul Berger, War-Making By the President, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
29, 40-43 (1972) (analyzing those debates).
135
Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution: Iraq and the Crisis of
Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447, 453 (2011).
136
Indeed, a committed textualist ought to infer the opposite result. The Constitution assigns
Congress power to “define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and
offenses against the law of nations.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 10. Reading Article I as
exclusive—as the Court has done in Chadha, Bowsher, and like jurisprudence—leads to the
conclusion that the federal government has no power to criminalize.
137
That common law of crime was recognized in eight federal circuits in the 1790s. see Gary D.
Rowe, The Sound of Silence: United States v Hudson & Goodwin, the Jeffersonian Ascendancy,
and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J . 919, 920 n.8 (1992) (collecting
cases); see also Kathryn Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority, Federalism and the
Common Law of Crimes in the Early Republic, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 223, 263 (1986) (mapping
debates about the federal common law of crime).
138
United States v Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812).
133

29

substantive crimes in effect restored starting power to Congress, depriving the
executive of the power to take the initiative.
Finally, robust protection of congressional first-mover prerogatives in the
domestic policy domain implies careful policing of the boundary between
enforcing an enacted statute and using that statute as a springboard for
independent policymaking. An “intelligible principle” from Congress was, and
technically still is, required to guide any exercise of executive branch
discretion.139 The extent of congressional agenda-setting power is measured in
inverse proportion to the enforcement—or, as explored further below, nonenforcement140—of that specification demand. Among its other effects, failure to
enforce a non-delegation rule in an era of broad agency rulemaking authority
would mean that the status quo sheltered by bicameralism and presentment141 is
more likely to be comprised of Article II-calibrated norms.
Even when the Court recognizes a domain of threshold executive-branch
authority, it also stresses residual pathways for congressional control. For
example, describing the exclusive presidential power to recognize foreign
sovereigns in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry—in effect, an allocation of
starting power to the president rather than Congress—the Court cautioned that it
did “not question the substantial powers of Congress over foreign affairs in
general or passports in particular.”142 Hence, it would seem that the Constitution
would generally require the legislative branch of Article I to be the first mover.143
2.

Appointments as a Form of Agenda Setting

Once regulatory statutes are enacted, the manner in which they are
enforced often turns on decisions made by federal agencies’ leadership. The
mechanism for appointing senior officials to those agencies, therefore, acts as a
139
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subsequent moment for influencing the federal policy agenda. By alternating
either zealous or reluctant agencies heads, political leaders can recalibrate agency
enforcement efforts. Appointments to federal agencies, therefore, provide a
second agenda-setting mechanism in the regulatory domain after the enactment of
a statute.144
The constitutional scheme for appointments of both officials and federal
judges is “a mirror image” of default rule in other settings. “Whereas Article I
empowers the Congress to set the legislative agenda, the Appointments Clause
grants agenda-setting power to the president on appointments matters.”145 Indeed,
Article II of the Constitution vests presidents with indefeasible control over the
selection of “principal officers” subject to possible rejection by the Senate.146
Article II further grants the president power to make “recess” appointments
without a Senate vote.147 One study of appointments to twelve agencies between
1945 and 2000 found that 12 percent were made without Senate advice and
consent, with presidents Eisenhower, Truman, and Reagan using the tactic most
frequently.148 In its recent decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning, the Court defined
the president’s power to extend to all breaks in legislative proceedings more than
three days in length, without regard to when the vacancy first arose.149 Although
some commentators have characterized Noel Canning as a “broad” construction
of presidential power,150 the ultimate effect of the opinion likely hinges on the
Senate’s willingness to recess in ways that triggers presidential appointive power.
Nevertheless, it is plausible to generalize to the effect that the president has
starting power in respect to most important federal appointments.
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3.

The Design of Federal Agencies

Arrow’s theorem and its successors might seem to suggest that instability
will be limited to the plural branches—Congress and the federal judiciary—while
the “unitary executive”151 will evade its perils. If allocating decisions to the
executive obviated the trade-offs identified in social choice theory, then this might
provide a powerful reason for allocating larger authority to Article II rather than
to Article I or Article III. Indeed, it is certainly true that the hierarchical structure
of an executive branch peaked with a singular head provides at least one
putatively instability-proof channel for policy choice.152 But not all decisionmaking in the executive branch is channeled through a singular vessel. Article II
provides no safe harbor from instability.
There are two reasons to believe instability is a more substantial
possibility in executive branch decision-making than is commonly realized. First,
the Constitution does not assume that the president will shoulder the task of
translating law into policy on its own. The opinions clause of Article II, to the
contrary, assumes a multiplicity of “departments” in a hierarchical relationship
with the president.153 Many important decisions taken by the executive branch
implicate several different agencies and are reached through either formal or
“informal and relatively invisible.154 Some statutes contain what Jody Freeman
and Jim Rossi call “concurrence requirements” that make interagency agreement a
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The unitary executive theory of Article II of the Constitution holds that the President must have
“the power to supervise and control all subordinate executive officials exercising executive power
conferred explicitly by either the Constitution or a valid statute.” Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H.
Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1153, 1177 n.119 (1992). Were the unitary executive theory to hold in practice (which even its
proponents do not claim), it might stifle some, but not all, the institutional features that conduce to
instability in decision-making within the executive. Cf. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B.
Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L. J. 541, 581-82 (1994) (setting
forth implications of the theory for independent agencies).
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J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies As Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2232
(2005) (claiming that “[a] great deal of interagency communication occurs in the administrative
state”). A weaker form of collective choice has been identified in the adjudicative context. See
Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805, 813
(2015) (“Resolving administrative claims often involves interagency coordination throughout the
process. Agencies coordinate throughout their investigations and claim development by sharing
both facts and legal analyses with one another.”).
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prerequisite of regulatory intervention, 155 much as Article I requires the
concurrence of several elected bodies before a proposal becomes law. Even absent
a formal interagency process, the regulatory process creates opportunities for
instability to enter executive decision-making. Part of the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affair’s (OIRA’s) function, for instance, is to manage “a
genuinely interagency process.”156 Whenever this entails more than two agencies
debating over more than two possible policy choices, there is an act of collective
choice that must be reached through some decision rule—a decision rule that risks
instability and incoherence.
Second, the design of post-New Deal regulatory agencies has often been
motivated by a concern that the agency will succeed to the influence of “wellfinanced and politically influential special interest groups.”157 One of the agency
design choices thought to hinder capture is multiplicity. There are by one recent
count forty-three federal agencies captained by multimember boards.158 The plural
structure of these agencies’ leadership means their decisions are vulnerable to the
incoherence and instability dynamics identified in the social choice literature. It is
also worth noting that about half of these multimember boards are statutorily
required to show “partisan balance” in their composition.159 This means that these
boards tend to have more heterogeneous preferences than might otherwise be
anticipated,160 which means they have a less restricted domain of choices; as a
result, they will tend to be more vulnerable to instability.161 The choice between
such multimember boards and single-headed agencies, therefore, implicates a
trade-off between the risk of capture and the risk of instability or paralysis.
155

Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1131, 1160-61 (2012).
156
Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126
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of partisan balance requirements back to the 1862 Utah Commission).
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Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 103
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In summary, problems of agenda control are endemic across the federal
government. Article II supplies no escape route from the trade-offs presented by
social choice theory by dint of the unitary nature of its textual design.
D.

Agenda Control and the Judiciary

A multimember national judiciary, like a plural legislature, faces both the
problem of selecting questions to address from a large background population of
potential disputes, and then the difficulty of overcoming Arrovian instability in
decision-making processes. The Constitution contains two agenda-setting
mechanisms for judicial action: first, the congressional power to calibrate the
scope of federal-court jurisdiction and second, the reticulated doctrine of standing
inferred from the text of Article III.
1.

Jurisdictional Calibration as Agenda Control

Like the domain of potential objects of government regulation, the
universe of potential disputes amenable to federal-court resolution is too large to
be compassed by the federal judiciary. Scarcity of adjudicative resources has
implications both for the settlement function of the U.S. Supreme Court and also
the more retail dispute-resolution service offered in district courts.
The Supreme Court is not centrally concerned with the resolution of
individuals’ disputes. It rather endeavors to resolve legal questions of wideranging importance.162 At the same time, the Court lacks the resources, and
perhaps the political support,163 to decide all constitutional questions of large
national significance. In contrast, federal district courts are engaged in a distinct
kind of routinized resolution of granular individual disputes, the vast majority of
which lack national resonance. Yet like the Supreme Court, federal district courts
cannot possible handle all potentially justiciable disputes.164 Even in the limited
domain of constitutional disputes, the volume of routine government actions that
162

Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1385 (1997) (emphasizing Supreme Court's role “as the authoritative settler
of constitutional meaning”).
163
The leading empirical studies of the Court’s “diffuse” support find a reservoir o public support
that the Court can draw upon. See James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta
Spence, Measuring Attitudes toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354,
355 (2003) (documenting (providing data on support of the Supreme Court from 1973 to 2000);
see also Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the Purse nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in
the Supreme Court, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1209, 1220-23 (1986) (charting changes in confidence
in Court from the late 1960s to the early 1980s).
164
For an example of judicial awareness of this point, see Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074,
2080 (2011) (“Courts should think carefully before expending scarce judicial resources to resolve
difficult and novel questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation that will have no effect on
the outcome of the case.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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might be characterized as violations of due process or equal protection norms
means that lower courts need docket management tools to staunch a potentially
overwhelming flow of litigation.165
In the first instance, the Constitution reposes the power to shape the
judicial agenda in Congress’s hand.166 Congress not only has threshold authority
to determine whether lower courts exist at all,167 but also can carve “Exceptions,
and . . . Regulations” to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.168 Since
it’s founding, Congress has modulated both the extent of lower court jurisdiction
and also Supreme Court settlement authority in response to changing social,
political, and ideological demands.169 Since the antebellum period, the Court has
recognized broad congressional power over lower-court jurisdiction. 170
Regulation of the high court’s appellate jurisdiction triggers more heated
controversy. 171 Today, the Supreme Court exercises almost complete
discretionary authority over the exercise of that appellate jurisdiction via the use
of the certiorari system—but it is easy to forget that certiorari was a congressional
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choice, one that can be presumptively unraveled by legislative hands.172 The fact
that Constitution reposes agenda control power for the judiciary in the elected
branches has engendered much anxiety and hand-wringing among scholars.173
Nevertheless, in the absence of a definitive statement to the contrary from the
Court, the text of the Article III would seem to vest the legislature with tolerably
broad authority to determine which constitutional questions of national import end
up on the judiciary’s agenda.174
2.

Justiciability Doctrine as Agenda Control

A second species of agenda control power lies with the courts rather than
Congress. The Justices have authority to develop doctrine that selects between
litigants in ways that shape the flow of issues presented in subsequent periods. I
use the example of standing doctrine here, but a parallel point might be made with
many other doctrines, including ripeness, mootness, and the elaborate judge-made
structures of state sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court has read the words
“case” and “controversy” in Article III to limit the class of cognizable disputes.
One element of the ensuing body of justiciability doctrine concerns the standing
of plaintiffs to seek judicial redress.175 It is typically said that standing’s central
function is “ensure that the people most directly concerned are able to litigate the
questions at issue.”176 But in a pair of insightful articles, Maxwell Stearns has
adduced another, quite ingenious explanation for standing doctrine: these rules
constitute a judicially fashioned source of structure-induced equilibrium.177 A
further inference from Stearns logic is the use of stare decisis to limit the
emergence of cycling by making a first resolution of an issue presumptively
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conclusive, even when a majority might exist to overturn it, provides another
guarantor of stability in judicial outcomes.
The potential for Arrovian instability arises whenever a multimember
must select among more than two alternative rules: Arrow’s theorem holds that a
majority votes sequentially and pairwise for A over B, B over C, and A over C.178
Absent some constraint on the reconsideration of A, a Court facing these
alternatives can “continue to cycle indefinitely, leading to a stalemate.” 179
Alternatively, if previously defeated options are eliminated from consideration by
the doctrine of stare decisis, “the power to set the agenda, meaning the power to
determine the order in which options are presented for voting” will be outcome
dispositive.180 Courts are vulnerable to a second kind of instability called the
doctrinal paradox. This arises when a collective entity forms a judgment on a
single matter based on numerous sub-issues, but different ultimate results are
obtained by a single all-or-nothing vote versus seriatim issue-by-issue voting over
sub-issues.181 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently confronted a dispute in
which outcome-voting and issue-voting in an antitrust case would have resulted in
different results because of three judges’ views on an antitrust standing and an
antitrust merits question.182 (That case is unusual, perhaps, because of the judges
recognized the doctrinal paradox, and provided cogent discussions of how it
should be resolved). In at least one case, moreover, it is arguably that a Justice
(perhaps strategically) decided to switch from outcome-based voting to issuevoting for the purpose of influencing the outcome of a case.183
Standing rules, Stearns ingeniously argues, do not entirely extinguish
instability in multimember courts. Rather, standing rules tether access to the
federal courthouse to a set of facts—injury-in-fact—largely outside the control of
individual litigants. 184 Stearns thus characterizes the injury-in-fact element of
standing doctrine as “likely beyond” the power of even powerful interest groups
178
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seeking judicial ratification of a non-Condorcet-winner rule. 185 Standing
doctrine’s injury-on-fact rule, in Stearns’ view, therefore prevents interest groups
from engaging in “advertent or ideological path manipulation.”186 It thus shifts
agenda control power away from litigants, whose privilege to litigate depends on
judges’ willingness to recognize a given injury. On this account, standing does not
supply a guarantee that a Condorcet winner (if one exists) will emerge from a
sequence of litigated cases or that the particular order in which issues arises does
not influence the final equilibrium reached by the Court. Nor will it prevent
Justices from exploiting the doctrinal paradox.187
In sum, the institutional responses to Arrovian instability in the judiciary
are a blend of interbranch and precedential tools. Congressional regulation of
lower court jurisdiction—the bounds of which have constantly shifted over time
as Congress has hemmed in or let out the judicial role in response to fluctuating
social demands—determines the range of issues that federal courts can confront
from among the heterogeneous world of potential legal questions. Standing and
stare decisis doctrines, in contrast, might be explained as efforts to prevent certain
forms of strategic action and induce a minimum of stability. Notably, neither form
of agenda-control device precludes strategic flipping between outcome-voting and
issue-voting, strategic decisions to grant or deny certiorari review,188 or other
retail judicial efforts to shape the law by leveraging agenda control power.
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presumptively, non-Cordorcet minority from forcing its preferences into law through the
judiciary.”); see also Stearns, Justiciability, supra note 177, at 1395-96 (asserting that the injuryin-fact rule “properly understood, is not really about injury at all. Instead, the term “injury” is a
metaphor. The relevant inquiry in comparing these cases is whether the facts alleged are sufficient
to overcome the burden of congressional inertia”). Where the judiciary’s preferences diverge from
those of the general public, however, standing might not have that democracy promoting effect
that Stearns envisages. Instead, standing may prevent Condorcet majorities in the general
population from manipulating the order in which issues are presented to a Court in order to ensure
that the popular median preference, not the judicial median preference, becomes law.
186
Stearns, Justiciability, supra note 177, at 1400-01. The Supreme Court’s discretion in respect to
whether to grant review via a petition for certiorari, Stearns notes, is subject to potential
manipulation by the Justices, and cannot prevent the manipulation of jurisprudential paths in the
federal appellate courts. Id. at 1350-53.
187
Nash argues that “courts do not adhere to a strict outcome-based voting regime but rather
follow a modified outcome-based voting protocol,” and that this regime, coupled with restraints on
interlocutory appeals, increases the frequency with which the doctrinal paradox can arise. Nash,
supra note 183, at 84-89. As a result, the doctrinal instability can emerge in and across cases.
188
For evidence that the voting on certiorari petitions is informed by strategic, policy-focused
considerations, see Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court: The
Collision of Policy and Jurisprudence, 71 J. POL. 1062, 1072 (2009) (finding based on a study of a
random sample of 358 noncapital petitions, that “Justices grant review when they believe that the
policy outcome of their merits decision will be better ideologically for them than the status quo”).

38

E.

A Taxonomy of the Constitution’s Agenda Control Mechanisms

This Part has demonstrated that the Constitution contains a wide array of
agenda-setting rules within the separation of powers domain alone. These devices
respond either to capacity constraints and the need to select only a slice of issues
for government intervention and also to the immanent specter of instability in
collective choice mechanisms. Agenda control instruments in the Constitution
also work in diverse ways, assigning power to a range of actors inside and outside
the Constitution. In the aggregate, they comprise a central element of our
Constitution’s design.
The heterogeneity of agenda control devices found in the Constitution,
however, should not deflect analysis. Despite their diversity, it is possible to
organize those diverse instruments of institutional design into a tolerable, simple
taxonomical framework—one that should enable further analysis. The agenda
control instruments adumbrated above can be usefully organized according to
three parameters: (1) starting powers v. concurrence powers; (2) intramural v.
external powers; and (3) state v. nonstate actors. Institutional designers can
advance different goals, I suggest, by toggling between these various options.
This section sets forth those different design choices, as illuminated in the
Constitution’s text. It further sets forth variations within some of those large
categories.
The first margin concerns the timing of an agenda setter’s power, in
particular whether that power entails the ability to start a decisional process, or
whether it is a subsequent power to concur that is conditional on another actor’s
decision to set in motion a process. Starting powers are constitutional
endowments to select an issue from the array of possible objects of government
regulation and to initiate policy-making on that topic. Moreover, the starting
powers in the Constitution come in two flavors: they can be either complete or
contingent. A contingent starting power entails the ability to offer a proposal
subject to rejection or amendment by another actor. The House’s origination
authority and the President’s appointment have this aspect. In both instances, the
starting power does not exhaust the preconditions for legal efficacy. On the other
hand, a complete starting power entails a power to not just make a proposal, but
also to preclude any stalling or veto. The presidential “recognition power”
described in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry,”189 for example, allows the
executive to present the other branches with a fait accompli with immediate legal
and diplomatic consequences.190 Similarly, the recess appointment power is a
189

135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084-85 (2015).
Id. (recognizing “[l]egal consequences,” including the recognized sovereign’s right to sue, to
claim sovereign immunity, act-of-state immunity, and noting that recognition is “a precondition of
regular diplomatic relations”).
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complete, if temporally bounded, power to invest a person with the legal powers
and perquisites of a federal office.191
Concurrence powers are conditional on another institution’s power to
initiate state action. At least formally, the Constitutional text seems to assign
concurrence powers to the president (who can veto legislation), the Senate (which
can resist treaties) and the judiciary (which must shape the mandate engrafted into
jurisdictional legislation). Concurrence powers might further be dichotomized as
either plenary or partial. A plenary concurrence power allows an office-holder
not merely to stop a proposal, but also to alter it. The Senate’s role under the
Origination Clause has this aspect, as does the Court’s discretionary control of its
own appellate jurisdiction. 192 In other cases, a concurrence power is partial
insofar as it only permits approval or disapproval of the first mover’s proposal
without substitution of an alternative. The Senate’s role in the appointments
process has this character. These terms, plenary and partial, are useful heuristics
describing end-points of a range, not precise descriptions. To see this, consider
how Congress’s lawmaking power should be characterized. On the one hand,
Congress’s super-majoritarian power to enact laws over a presidential veto might
be seen as an effectively complete power. Where Congress eliminates a criminal
penalty or authorizes private behavior, in particular, the executive can do little to
resist. But when Congress’s intended policy change depends on executive-branch
action, legislative power looks more partial.
The second design decision focuses upon the choice between intramural
versus external assignment of agenda control. An intramural agenda control
power is one that assigns to a single entity the power to select among potential
policy pathways, and also the power to act upon that choice. For example, the
President’s recess appointment power is intramural insofar as it allows the
executive branch to exercise control at a key veto-gate over regulatory policy.193
Similarly, the new-minted recognition power of Zivotofsky is also an intramural
instrument of agenda control: it dictates which of several potential diplomatic
stances the United States will adopt toward diverse international counterparties.194
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And it is possible to see standing doctrine as a kind of intramural agenda-control
device. In one prominent account, standing doctrine is a fabrication of liberal
Justices during the New Deal seeking to insulate regulatory initiatives from
judicial unsettling. 195 That is, standing is an invention of the federal courts
grounded in an ingenuous reading of isolate text fragments from the
Constitution—an autochthonic mechanism for self-regulating the order of cases
presented for judicial resolution.
By contrast, an external agenda control power is one that divides between
entities (a) the power to propose or vote on a matter, and (b) the power to act
upon that matter. It is perhaps unsurprising that a Constitution that consciously
positions institutional powers to check and balance each other196 would frequently
split the power to propose from the power to act. Across Congress and the
executive, it is the executive that is empowered to act, but Congress alone that can
propose a policy. Examples of external powers include the president’s power to
nominate Article III judges, the Senate’s point to block principal officer
appointments, and Congress’s authority to enact jurisdictional statutes.
The third and final distinction to draw is between the exercise of agendasetting power by a state actor, as opposed to a person plainly outside the state
apparatus but operating under a constitutional license. The lion’s share of
examples supplied in Part II, of course, concerns allocations of power within the
three federal branches. In descriptive legislative agenda-setting, I identified
political parties as central stabilizing forces. To this one might add the role of the
media as an agenda-setting, although one more prone to dis-equilibriating effects
than stability.197
Table 2 summarizes the resulting taxonomy of agenda control devices
found in the Constitution. Examples are provided for each taxonomical cell for
which they are available (with italics used to indicate those institutional design
possibilities that have been struck down by the Court on constitutional grounds).

determine who in Congress has power to block proposed legislation, and thus has important
outcome-related consequences.
195
Compare Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1432, 1436-38 (1988) (advancing the thesis of standing as an invention of liberal Justices), with
Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? An Empirical
Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921-2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591, 695-967 (2010) (finding
that “the insulation thesis does not fully explain the conception or invention of the modern
standing doctrine”).
196
For a canonical statement of this position, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120 (1976) (per
curiam).
197
See supra note 113.
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Table 2. A Taxonomy of Agenda Control Mechanisms
State Actors

Starting
Power

Concurrence
Power

Intramural

External

The President’s recess
appointment power
The President’s treaty
powers
The proposing chamber
in veto override votes
Standing doctrine

Congress’s power to enact
bills
Congress’s control of
federal-court jurisdiction
The House’s Origination
Power

Nonstate
Actor
Political parties
Initiative
mechanisms in the
states

The Senate’s role in fiscal
legislation
The Senate’s role in
appointments and treaties
Legislative veto

The President’s veto
Line-item veto

As diverse as the options arrayed on Table 2 are, the variety of agendasetting rules in the U.S. context hardly exhausts the field. To the contrary, there
are many devices for agenda control that do not appear in this enumeration.
Consider, for example, the mechanism for setting the legislative agenda in fifth
century B.C. Athens, in the wake of Cleisthenes’ democratic reforms. Athenian
legislative power was partitioned between an Assembly, open to all who chose to
attend on a give day, and a Council of 500, whose paid members were chosen by
lot and limited to two years’ service.198 The Council had the power to set the
Assembly’s agenda, in the sense of defining the issues under consideration.199 The
effect of this system was to split the power to establish the threshold set of
questions under deliberation from final decisional authority. Moreover, the
randomization rule for selecting Council members, in tandem with a term limit,
can be understood as a means to rein in strategic use of the power to set threshold
agendas.200 Today, “random processes are virtually never found in parliamentary
law,” even though order-mandating rules are in effect “often … a randomizing
element.”201 This suggests that there are plausible and tractable design opinions
198

JOSIAH OBER, THE ATHENIAN REVOLUTION: ESSAYS ON ANCIENT GREEK DEMOCRACY AND
POLITICAL THEORY 25 (1996).
199
Id.; see also JOSIAH OBER, DEMOCRACY AND KNOWLEDGE: INNOVATION: INNOVATION AND
LEARNING IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 142-51 (2008) (describing the geographical roots and structure
of the Council, and noting the effect of term limits on preventing “a self-serving identity or
corporate culture”).
200
Once a question had been proposed, the assembly did not count votes, but instead employed
cheriotonia (a rough hand count) or even thorubus (acclamation by shouts). Melissa
Schwartzberg, Shouts, Murmurs and Votes: Acclamation and Aggregation in Ancient Greece, 18
J. POL. PHIL. 448, 464 (2010). Probabilistic modes of aggregation of this kind obscured cycles,
likely making the Council’s agenda-setting role even more significant.
201
Levmore, Parliamentary Law, supra note 74, at 990 n.57. Adam Samaha identifies the military
draft, randomized experiments in welfare policy in the 1960s, and federal land-grant lotteries, as
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that have yet to be explored in the American context.202 The diversity of observed
agenda control modalities in contemporary constitutional law, in short, should not
preclude experimentation with novel instruments for clarifying the focus on
government action and resolving instability when government acts.
III.

The Transformation of Constitutional Agenda Control

The Framers’ inclusion of a mechanism in the original constitutional text
is no guarantee of persistence. This Part revisits the allocation of agenda-control
powers between the three branches to consider how well the Framers’
constitutional allocation of agenda-control powers has fared. In brief, the careful
distribution of agenda-control powers described in Part II has not fared well:
Starting and concurrence powers have diffused across branch boundaries and
from within to outside government. By examining the taxonomy of agenda
control mechanisms developed in Part II.E, moreover, a logic of success and
failure emerges. Generally speaking, endogenous starting powers work all too
well, whereas external starting powers founder. Concurrence rules, whether
endogenous or external, have mixed success. Moreover, starting authority has
migrated away from the House of Representatives and from Congress more
generally toward the executive. On the other hand, the federal courts in general—
and the Supreme Court in particular—have wrestled away a large measure of
starting authority in relation to the range of issues to be settled through judicial
review on either constitutional or statutory grounds. While hardly powerless,
therefore, Congress no longer occupies the axial position the Framers envisaged.
This Part documents those changes and evaluates their consequences. I
identify two movements of agenda-control authority, the first from Congress to
the executive and the second from Congress to the federal courts (and the
Supreme Court in particular). These transfers of agenda-control authority, I
suggest, are better understood as evidence of salutary institutional adaption in the
teeth of continuing challenges than as infidelities to an original institutional
dispensation. Although each shift of agenda setting power has subtle
distributional consequences, none wants for rational justification.

three recent instances of randomization in government. Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in
Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 25-27 (2009). None of these examples concern agendasetting problems.
202
The role of the European Commission in setting the agenda for Europe-wide law-making is
another example. See George Tsebelis, The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional
Agenda Setter, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 128 (1994).
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A.

The Struggle for Agenda Control Between Congress and the
Executive

The trajectory of Congress-executive branch relations can be reframed as
an erosion of the original constitutional allocation of agenda-control authority
across several domains, including regulatory matters, fiscal decisions, and veto
overrides. Judicial efforts to prevent this shift have been erratic and ineffectual in
promoting any coherent vision of legislative process.
1.

Congress and the Nation’s Regulatory Agenda

Congress no longer has a monopoly on the nation’s regulatory agenda. It
is common knowledge that the nondelegation doctrine lies in desuetude both in
the courts and practical political life. 203 Its demise is exemplified by
administrative agencies’ recent efforts to deploy old statutes “deliberately and
strategically” to address policy problems that did not exist at the moment the
statute was initially enacted,204 a capacity aided by courts’ deference to agency
expertise as a means “to soften statutory rigidities or to adapt their terms to
unanticipated conditions.”205 In effect, these practices blunt legislators’ ability to
determine which social problems warrant political attention, and which do not.
Symptomatic of the erosion of congressional agenda control in the regulatory
sphere is the reflex, increasingly evinced both by courts and commentators, of
justifying exercises of regulatory power as democratic by dint of the president’s,
rather than Congress’s, democratic imprimatur. 206 That is, independent lawmaking by the executive is now vindicated with a normative theory of democracy
at variance with the theory implied in Article I.
Outside the ordinary regulatory sphere, Congress’s other regulatory
powers have similarly withered on the vine. Consider the powers to make war,
create international obligations, and define crimes. In each domain, Congress has
largely ceded agenda-setting authority to the executive. First, to near universal
203

Lawson, supra note 22, at 1243 (stating that the failure of the nondelegation rule faces “no
serious real-world legal or political challenges”).
204
Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 19
(2014) (giving as examples EPA's deployment of the CAA to address climate change and FERC's
use of the FPA to modernize electricity policy).
205
Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2102-03
(1990).
206
For judicial deployment of a presidential accountability trope in administrative law, see, e.g.,
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483 (2010); Dep’t of
Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1238 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring). For the
leading scholarly treatment, see Kagan, supra note 127, at 2332-33 (arguing that “[p}residential
administration promotes accountability” by “enabling the public to comprehend more accurately
the sources and nature of bureaucratic power” and “establish[ing] an electoral link between the
public and the bureaucracy”).
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obloquy,207 legislators have largely renounced their power to declare war, while
also abjuring the use of fiscal powers to discipline overseas military adventures.208
Presidential initiation of armed hostilities has become the rule, with or without a
sudden attack, while the Declare War clause has fallen into desuetude. 209
Symptomatic of this trend, the Declare War Clause has been invoked only five
times in American history.210 War-making, in important ways, is a prerogative of
the executive branch.211 Second, in the international domain, it is increasingly
common for the president to enter into so-called executive agreements, lacking
any congressional imprimatur, in lieu of treaties. 212 One commentator has
observed that between 1980 and 2000, the United States made 2744
congressional-executive agreements and only 375 treaties.213 The president can
also, by signing a treaty, encumber the United States with international
obligations even if the prospect of Senate ratification is dim.214 Finally, although
formally the first-mover in the definition of federal criminal law, in practice,
Congress is better viewed as responsive to executive-branch needs. Congress is
heavily and asymmetrically lobbied by the Department of Justice. 215 It has
enacted a network of federal criminal laws that delegate effectual policymaking
authority to prosecutors via “laws with punishments greater than the facts of the
offense would demand,” that “allow prosecutors to use the excessive punishments
as bargaining chips.”216 The perhaps ironic resemblance between the freewheeling
207

The original, and still, the best critique is JOHN H. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 47-54 (1993).
208
Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 135, at 476.
209
This has long been recognized. See Berger, supra note 134, at 58-59.
210
Jennifer K. Elsea & Richard F. Grimmett, Cong. Research Serv., RL 31133, Declarations of
War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal
Implications 4-5 (2007) (listing the War of 1812, the Mexican War of 1846, the Spanish American
War of 1898, World War I declared in 1917, and World War II).
211
At the time of this writing, this dynamic was playing out in respect to the conflict against the
Islamic State in Syria. See Manu Raju & Burgess Everett, War Authorization in Trouble on Hill,
POLITICO, March 5, 2015, http://www.politico.com/story/2015/03/no-clear-way-forward-isil-warauthorization-115773.html.
212
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 217 (2d ed. 1996)
(describing such agreements as a “complete alternative” to treaties). Henkin here understates the
degree of longstanding resistance of congressional-executive agreements. See, e.g., Edwin
Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements--A Reply, 54 YALE L.J. 616, 616 (1945).
213
Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking
in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1258-60 (2008).
214
David H. Moore, The President's Unconstitutional Treatymaking, 59 UCLA L. REV. 598, 60413 (2012) (explaining why, under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
signature of treaties incurs significant consequences even absent ratification).
215
Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional
Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 587-88 (2002) (describing the Justice Department as the only
“regular player” lobbying congressional staff on criminal justice policy); accord Rachel E.
Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 728 (2005) (“No other group comes close
to prosecutorial lobbying efforts on crime issues.”).
216
Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 880 (2009).
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days of the federal common law of crime217 and today’s open-ended statutory
delegations of criminalization only underscores the failure of Congress’s notional
starting power.
Ironically, even as Congress has otherwise ceded regulatory agendasetting power, the dykes to legislative action erected by the concurrence rules of
bicameralism and presentment have proved remarkably effective at precluding
formal legislative action.218 The high transaction costs of legislative action render
the low transaction costs of executive branch action all the more salient and
alluring.219 This has led presidents to refine their constitutional instruments of
policymaking. The appointments power, for example, effectively vests presidents
with continuing influence over the policy agenda.220 There is some empirical
uncertainty about the magnitude of this effect.221 A threshold reason for this
uncertainty is the observed historical variance in senatorial resistance to
presidential nominations.222 There is also some theoretical reason to suspect that
the effect of presidential appointive authority will be weaker than might appear at
first blush. To be sure, presidents have unfettered authority to pick candidates to
advance to the Senate, and can deploy their recess appointment power in the teeth
of senatorial opposition.223 (Executive branch lawyers, moreover, had crafted a
“broad construction” of the recess appointment power as early as the 1840s,224
217

See supra text accompanying note 137.
See supra text accompanying notes 85 to 91.
219
Freeman & Spence, supra note 204, at 8-17.
220
Nina A. Mendelson, The Uncertain Effects of Senate Confirmation Delays in the Agencies, 64
DUKE L.J. 1571, 1606 (2015) [hereinafter “Mendelsohn, Uncertain Effects”] (assuming
presidential incentives to make appointments in order to influence the content of substantive
policies); accord Glen O. Robinson, Independent Agencies: Form and Substance in Executive
Prerogative, 1988 DUKE L.J. 238, 250. But see David E. Lewis, The Personnel Process in the
Modern Presidency, 42 PRES. STUD. Q. 577, 584 (2012) (discussing the administration's incentive
to “reward campaign personnel, surrogates, and donors with jobs”). Similar considerations may
infuse notionally merit-based civil service hiring to which Article II does not apply. David E.
Lewis & Richard W. Waterman, The Invisible Presidential Appointments: An Examination of
Appointments to the Department of Labor, 2001-11, 43 PRES. STUD. Q. 35, 51 (2013) (presenting
evidence of presidential influence on agency staff level--noncareer SES or what are known as
Schedule C appointees); accord Nina Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and
Personnel Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 610-11 (2003).
221
For an optimistic view of that power’s scope, focusing on the Reagan presidency, see Terry M.
Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 235, 235 (John
E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989).
222
Resistance often takes the form of delay. See Nolan McCarty & Rose Razaghian, Advice and
Consent: Senate Responses to Executive Branch Nominations 1885-1996, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI.
1122, 1136-41(1999) (quantifying delays over time).
223
Indeed, Corley finds that presidents are most likely to invoke the recess appointment power
when they face large opposition in the Senate, and when they have a reserve of political capital.
Corley, supra note 148, at 677.
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Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Construction and Departmentalism: A Case Study of the
Demise of the Whig Presidency, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 425, 441 (2010).
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albeit one that received judicial blessing only in 2014.225). The Senate, however,
has been increasingly demurring to move appointees forward, leading to a
growing catalog of vacancies.226 That is, just as in other sequential, multi-stage
decisional processes, the advantage that accrues to the possessor of exclusive
proposal power is cabined when subsequent veto players are willing to pay the
political price of blocking action. Further, recent research identifies a relatively
short tenure of most Senate-confirmed officials, which implies that they are
unlikely to initiate, or see to completion, major policy initiatives.227 On the other
hand, the number of administrative positions subject to Senate confirmation has
seen a recent “staggering” uptick.228
The net effect of these cross-cutting trends on the magnitude of
presidential post-enactment control via the appointments power is hard to
quantify. Adding to the complexity of the analysis, any evaluation of ex post
presidential control over regulatory policy would also have to account for nonconstitutional instruments of regulatory control, such as centralized White House
regulatory review, as well as potentially severe epistemic constraints upon
congressional oversight.229 Nevertheless, it remains safe to say that the president’s
appointment power—just like bicameralism and the veto—still operates as a
potent downstream device for agenda control. The magnitude of its effect—
although uncertain—directly determines presidential authority over regulatory
agendas. The larger such power, the less important is the threshold specification
of regulatory policy by Congress via the exercise of bicameralism and
presentment.
2.

Congress and the Fiscal Agenda

At first blush, it would seem that constitutional starting rules are especially
significant allocations of decisional authority between constitutional actors in
respect to fiscal matters. The Origination Clause seems to imply that if the House
225

NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
Anne Joseph O'Connell, Shortening Agency and Judicial Vacancies Through Filibuster
Reform? An Examination of Confirmation Rates and Delays from 1981 to 2014, 64 DUKE L.J.
1645, 1677 (2015) (documenting recent increases in the duration of vacancies).
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Mendelsohn, Uncertain Effects, supra note 220, at 1595-96 (arguing that “political supervision
of significant regulatory activity is mainly reactive, not proactive. Midlevel Senate-confirmed
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The mean term of office of a Senate confirmed official is less than three years. Anne Joseph
O'Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 919
n.23 (2009).
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Joel D. Aberbach & Bert A. Rockman, The Appointments Process and the Administrative
Presidency, 39 PRES. STUD. Q. 38, 41, 48-49 (2009).
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For example, congressional efforts to oversee administrative agencies are limited by
legislators’ limited epistemic competence, and the relative expertise of agency officials. Terry M.
Moe, Political Control and the Power of the Agent, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 3 (2006). If epistemic
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wishes to resist the Senate’s initiatives, it can simply refuse to propose a fiscal
measure in the first instance. The power to hold-up the legislative process by
refusing to start the ball rolling would seem to imply a disproportionate power on
the House side. Consistent with this view, Adrian Vermeule has argued that the
Origination Clause vests the House with “an intangible but real form of firstmover advantage from its ability to set the policy agenda in ways that structure
both legislative and political debate.”230 The leading empirical study of the effect
of origination clauses in state constitutions suggests that this design choice
produces outcomes closer to the preferences of the median legislator in the
originating chamber (which may or may not be evidence that chamber’s
influence, as opposed to a stabilizing effect).231
For several reasons, however, it is not clear that the federal Origination
Clause has had, or even could have, the biasing effect in favor of the House that
the Framers anticipated. First, as a matter of theory, it is not the case that the first
option presented to a group of decision-makers engaged in serial votes over a
matter will be advantaged because of the possibility of strategic voting to defeat
the earlier proposal. 232 An agenda setter might instead seek to leverage the
epistemic effects of timing with a later proposal: because the latter allow for less
time for participants to learn about the proposal’s consequences, opponents of the
measure may have less time to develop empirical or theoretical counterarguments.
The asymmetric distribution of opportunities for learning, in short, can be used to
advantage a later option.233
A second reason for doubting the efficacy of the Origination Clause turns
on the longstanding practice among designers of procedural rules for collective
bodies of disfavoring earlier slots in a decisional process, which tend to be
allocated to less popular proposals. One example is found in the standard rules of
legislative procedure. Discussing the process of filling blanks in legislative
schemes, 234 Roberts’ Rules of Order states not only that “members have an
opportunity to weigh all choices before voting” but that entries be arranged such
230

Vermeule, supra note 11, at 424; id. at 425 (arguing “the House’s ability to demand a payment
for the renunciation of its origination privilege with respect to particular bills will skew the
distribution of political benefits between the House and the Senate in the House’s favor”). For a
formal model that predicts that bicameral chambers will endogenously sequence themselves to
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Theory and State Legislative Evidence, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1025, 1025 (1998).
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LEG. STUD. Q. 29, 39 (2005) [hereinafter “Rogers, Empirical Determinants”] (reporting a
statistically significant effect in the 40 percent of states that have an origination clause).
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See Levmore, Bicameralism, supra note 83, at 147. Claims about the House’s agenda-setting
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prepare offset this by gathering information before introducing the proposal.
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For instance, by assigning appropriated amounts to different tasks envisaged by a law.
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that “the one least likely to be acceptable will be voted on first.”235 This concern
resonates in congressional practice. Exemplifying the weakness of the House’s
power under the Origination Clause, the Senate has developed a practice of
striking the text of a House bill entirely and then replacing it with a wholly new
revenue-raising text.236 A recent scholarly treatment of the Origination Clause
observes that this maneuver was anticipated amongst the drafters of the
Constitution at Philadelphia.237 In short, from the Constitution’s inception, it may
well have been anticipated that the inter-cameral distributive effect of the
Origination Clause would be weak to non-existent.238 To the extent that the voting
public uses the Clause as a guide to facilitate retrospective voting on fiscal
matters, therefore, the Clause may well mislead more than it informs.
Finally, empirical evidence that the Origination Clause’s allocation of
starting power has empowered the more numerous chamber is also elusive.
Rather, congressional budgeting reforms enacted in the wake of the early 1970s
impoundment crisis239 have instead empowered the leadership of the two political
parties. The latter exercise effectual agenda-setting power by selecting and then
maintaining tight control over the membership of congressional committees
responsible for setting the concurrent budgetary resolution.240 Budgetary agenda
setting, in short, is not only external, but in the hands of a nonstate actor.
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3.

The Presidential Veto Override

The substantive effects of concurrence rules in the veto-override context
are more difficult to discern, in part because of an absence of empirical work on
the topic.241 Unlike the Origination context, the first mover in a veto override has
no framing power: a bill’s contents are identical during final passage and veto
override votes.242 In addition, it is the “rare” case in which a veto occurs (in two
percent of cases), and the even scarcer case that Congress decides to override that
veto (about forty-five percent after a non-pocket veto). 243 As a result, the
embedded starting rule and concurrent requirement within the veto override are
unlikely to be anticipated by participations in the regular enactment process.
At the same time, overrides are no mere formalism. They rather appear to
be surprisingly contested votes, with about 1 in 10 legislators who voted on the
final version of an enrolled bill switching sides either for or against the
president. 244 Patterns of vote switching seem to be explained by ideological
affinity with (or distance from) the president as well as a member’s length of
service on Capitol Hill.245 Neither of these factors cast light on the effect of the
override regime. To the contrary, they suggest that there is no informational
justification for the starting rule, since members already have the information
necessary to make a judgment about ideological affinities and tenure in
Congress.246 Perhaps the best that can be said in defense of the starting rule is that
it might be weakly justified as a means of clarifying political accountability. In
those rare cases that Congress decided to reject the President’s considered veto
decision—an action perhaps founded on constitutional objections to legislation—
the Framers may have believed it was important to pick out in the constitutional
text which of the two Houses took the lead. Of course, given the need for both
Houses’ consent to an override (i.e., an embedded concurrence rule), and the
possibility that voters are more attentive to the news-engendering second and final
241
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vote, it is quite possible that this accountability justification is frail in practice. If
that is so, the lesson of the veto override provision may be that the Framers
occasionally deployed agenda control instruments for no clear purpose.
4.

Judicial Efforts to Buttress Congressional Agenda-Setting Power

To the extent that the Court has resisted these trends, its efforts have been
quixotic and without plainly beneficial effect. The Court has resisted extra-textual
supplements to the legislative process in the form of the legislative veto, the lineitem veto, and automatic fiscal adjustments.247 But none of these additional vetogates would necessarily compromise the stabilizing function of Article I, Section
7, nor undermine its status-quo-protective effect (to the extent that is even
desirable). Rather, the effect of additional veto-gates would be merely to change
the interbranch distribution of rents from the legislative process. Bargaining
would continue within the space established by the bounds set by constitutional
veto players, with the ultimate outcome moving to reflect the different balance of
power between different participants.
For example, the line-item veto when enacted at the state level generates a
pattern of fiscal outcomes that are somewhat more favorable for the president’s
party, without changing overall levels of deficit spending. 248 Although the
legislative deal reached in specific cases might differ, the domain of possible
legislative outcomes would—social theory predicts—remains constant. The
separation of powers, of course, does not entitle legislative or executive actors to
specific victories or particular outcomes. Indeed, it is likely that abolition of the
legislative veto, the line-item veto, and the lockbox mechanism each analogously
scrambled the distribution of rents from legislative bargaining—but not in any
stable way. Provided that the range of expected legislative outcomes remains
unchanged, however, it is hard to see why this distributive effect is significant,
and, correspondingly, hard to see any constitutional reason to read Article I,
Section 7 as exclusive. The line-item veto, the legislative veto, and the lockbox
mechanism are more consistent with the constitutional design than the Court’s
pinched attention to text suggests.249
247
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To a certain extent, the foregoing echoes a familiar story of legislative
decline and executive branch growth. A central difference from standard
accounts, however, is the presence of a new causal mechanism. Explanations for
today’s balance of power between Articles I and II, I have suggested, are not to be
found solely in contemporary institutional and political developments such as the
rise of the regulatory state, the demand for complex rule-making for a rapidly
expanding national economy, or America’s post-World War II international
hegemony. Instead, the seeds of the contemporary status quo lie deeper, buried in
constitutional text. The powers lost by Congress and gained by the executive are
directly and intimately linked to the agenda control devices woven into the
constitutional fabric at the Philadelphia Convention. Whereas the devices
assigned to the president, as well as the role of concurrence rules in impeding
legislative impetuosity, have thrived, the devices meant to empower Congress
have crumbled. If today’s arrangements are to be condemned, in short, it is as
much an inculpation of original constitutional design as of post-ratification
institutional drift.
B.

The Struggle for Agenda Control Between Congress and the Court

The constitutional law of agenda control also casts light on the changing
relationship of the federal courts to the political branches, Congress in particular.
Recall that Part II identified two forms of agenda control regulating the issues
presented to the judiciary: the congressional titration of federal lower court and
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction on the one hand, and standing doctrine’s
constraint on litigant manipulation of the order in which legal issues are presented
on the other.250 Neither of these constraints operates today as initially intended. At
the Supreme Court level in particular, Congress has effectively delegated agendasetting authority to the Justices, while standing doctrine has proved too malleable
to impede interest groups from engaging in strategic litigation.251 In practice,
though, the main beneficiary of doctrinal ductility is the Court itself, which carves
out exceptions for litigants and issues it disfavors while openly inviting other
litigation. The critique of judicial activism leveled most recently by the dissenting
Justices in Obergefell v. Hodges, 252 in other words, can be applied to the Court as
federal budgetary expenditures, and finding that states that heavily supported the incumbent
president in previous presidential elections tended to receive more funds, while marginal and
swing states were not rewarded).
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a whole. Indeed, because those same dissenters have rank among the ideological
majority of the Court, they have greater incentive than their liberal colleagues to
use standing rules to sculpt both their docket and the flow of doctrine from the
Court.253 The net result of these trends is a shift of substantive power from the
political branches to the Court—a power distilled, most importantly, in the
Court’s almost unfettered authority to select which issues to adjudicate.
This shift began with the pathmarking 1891 Evarts Act, which started the
move from mandatory to discretionary appellate jurisdiction, and was packaged in
Congress as “a politically neutral performance attempt to relieve the workload of
the Supreme Court.”254 Subsequently, Congress’s approach to the courts reflected
both the influence of the judiciary as a prestigious interest group255 and also a
bipartisan interest in maintaining a tribunal able to resolve nationally contested
disputes of constitutional moment.256 As a result, Congress has declined (with rare
exceptions) to restrict the Court’s reach by use of its power to craft exceptions to
its appellate jurisdiction notwithstanding its clear textual power to do so. 257
Instead, congressional exercise of its exception authority has had the effect of
furthering the judiciary’s interests of maximizing discretion and minimizing the
burden of unwanted adjudication. 258 In short, Congress has abandoned the
effectual exercise of its agenda-setting power. The result is that the Court has
gained substantially more power to determine which issues it addresses. Judicial
control, once exogenous, is now endogenous.
Equally, Stearns’s aspirations for standing doctrine have been undermined
by the incoherence of the injury-in-fact rule and also the willingness of Justices
not only to use standing doctrine as a way of favoring or disfavoring litigants, but
also to use their platform at the Court to invite new interest groups to seek review
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of issues that might otherwise never reach the Court. Standing law is commonly
condemned as “lawless, illogical, and dishonest.” 259 The injury-in-fact
requirement, in particular, conduces to “open-ended, free-form, and near
metaphysical inquiries into the adequacy of alleged injuries.”260 Stearns argues
that absent the constraint imposes by standing doctrine, “the Court's nominal
power of docket control would be largely illusory” because litigants could
manufacture circuit splits that the Court would feel compelled to adjudicate.261
Stearns’ prediction, however, has not been borne out in practice. Only a
“small proportion of the nation's agenda … directly before the Supreme Court in
particular and the courts in general.”262 There is little evidence that the Court is
pressed against its collective will into addressing some issues and not others by
conniving interest groups. To the contrary, the Court has retained a large measure
of agenda control notwithstanding the inefficacy of standing doctrine for two
reasons. First, the very fluidity of standing doctrine empowers the Justices to
carve out favored and disfavored classes of litigants (and hence, legal issues) in
ways that reassert judicial primacy. Both liberal and conservative Justices have
deployed standing doctrine to close the courthouse door to disfavored litigants in
hotly contested domains like Establishment Clause jurisprudence.263 Depending
on their priors, the Justices are also more or less rigorous when applying the
presumption against facial challenges, especially in structural constitutional cases,
and also in looking for traditional indicia of harm necessary for Article III
standing.264 And when litigants prove too reticent to press an issue that interests
the Justices, they unheedingly introduce it themselves. The core constitutional
question in Zivotofsky, for example, was of sufficient interest to the Justices that
they added it a first-round certiorari petition.265
Second, the Justices have become increasingly willing and able to use
their opinions as platforms to signal to potential litigants which legal issues they
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should present to courts. For example, in the 2014 Term, Justice Thomas issued a
series of striking opinions in which he invited litigants to challenge basic tenets of
the regulatory state on originalist grounds.266 None of these concurrences were
strictly necessary to the resolution of a case at hand, even on Justice Thomas’s
own logic. All comprised dicta plainly aimed at influencing the behavior of future
litigants. (As an aside, all also make a mockery of pretenses of judicial restraint or
modesty). On the other side of the ideological spectrum, Justice Breyer exploited
an Eighth Amendment challenge to a method of execution to invite
reconsideration of the death penalty tort court.267 Both liberal and conservative
Justices, moreover, have also been willing to exploit opinions dissenting from the
denial of a certiorari petition as a means to signal their interest in future
litigation. 268 By signaling issues of potential interest, teasing flexibility from
justiciability doctrine, and adding issues to certiorari petitions as necessary, the
Justices obtain a large measure of discretion over the contents of their appellate
docket, amplifying the endogenous agenda control vested by statute from 1891
onwards.
In his dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges, Chief Justice Roberts bemoaned the
majority’s willingness to “seize[e] for itself a question the Constitution leaves to
the people, at a time when the people are engaged in a vibrant debate on that
question.”269 It is no great feat to parry Chief Justice Roberts with a tu quoque.270
But trading allegations of judicial overreach hardly edifies: the more important
point is that the power to pluck issues from the public agenda is deeply woven
into the current constitutional matrix for judicial power. It is the shift from
exogenous to endogenous agenda control that lies behind the Court’s
extraordinary rise in prestige and national prominence—a shift that liberals and
conservatives alike have exploited and decried in almost equal measure.
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C.

Evaluating the Transformation of Constitutional Agenda Control

The standard story of how federal governance changed across the
twentieth century focuses on the erosion of limits on congressional power, to the
detriment of both the states and individuals’ interests,271 and the accretion of
power by the executive branch.272 It thus seeks to explain institutional change as a
process of unraveling boundaries on institutional power.
My central aim in this Part has been to identify the constitutional law of
agenda control as another important but underappreciated important site of
constitutional conflict and transformation. To be sure, this alternative account has
continuities with the standard story of how the federal government has changed
over time. The demise of the nondelegation doctrine, for example, continues to
play a central role in both explanations of shifting configurations of government
power.273 Nevertheless, I suggest that the constitutional law of agenda control has
been an analytically distinct site of change to the interbranch balance of power
across the twentieth century. To understand the increasingly robust authority of
the executive and the judiciary alike, as well as the impoverishment of the
legislative power, it is necessary to account for the legal assignment of agenda
control as well as changing institutional capacities and positive law-making
powers. Standard accounts that focus on bureaucratic personnel or on external
legal constraints alone, by contrast, fail to tell the whole story.
The role that shifting agenda control has played in constitutional history
further raises a normative question: What should we make of this erosion of a
seemingly central element of constitutional design? And while it seems highly
unlikely that courts, wielding the power of constitutional review, could undo the
concatenated institutional changes described in this Part—doing so, after all
would unwind much of their own power to identify and resolve constitutional
issues—should courts invalidate new changes to the division of agenda-setting
power between the branches? In part, the answers to these questions are
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contingent on large, unresolved questions of constitutional theory. Originalists,
for example, will offer different analyses from consequentialist scholars. Without
offering a complete theory of constitutional interpretation, some tentative
normative conclusions can be offered here.
The constitutional law of agenda control is part of what I have elsewhere
called the negotiated structural constitution.274 The institutional balance of power
over agenda-control shifted in part because the Framers’ selection of agenda
setting mechanisms was not always successful: some of their design choices
misfired, when others succeeded rather too well. As a result, branches vested with
an agenda-control power that they could not effectively deploy found it beneficial
to assign that power to a coordinate branch. Generally, this involved Congress
legislating away its agenda-setting authority to either the executive branch or
Congress. At the same time, branches capable of effectively wielding an agenda
setting authority have wielded it to the exclusion of other branches. Institutional
success in the use of some powers, in other words, engenders confidence to make
broader claims to competence, which in turn are accepted or even ratified by other
branches. On a very superficial view, this is a simple story of constitutional
failure. The original dispensation and the primacy of Congress therein have
collapsed. Its rectification would entail massive transfers of authority between the
branches to recreate the primordial institutional status quo. Consistent with this
view, Justice Thomas has recently proposed several radical changes to the law,
including a reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine, a limit to agency adjudication,
and a rollback of judicial deference to agencies’ constructions of both organic
statutes and their own regulations.275
Although Justice Thomas’s arguments, and the originalist account that
underpins them, have obvious continuing appeal to many, they are not the only
way to gloss changes to the constitutional law of agenda control. In earlier work, I
have argued that the Constitution need not be read to assign immutable
obligations to specific institutions. 276 Rather, the Constitution provisionally
assigns regulatory entitlements to different branches as a threshold matter. Just
like individuals, each branch can waive or transfer its exercise of an institutional
interest either because it receives something of benefit in return, or because it
perceives the other branch as better suited to carrying out a given function. In
military and foreign affairs matters, for example, Congress has ceded turf to the
executive in part because it benefits by avoiding hard foreign-policy decisions,
and in part because it views the executive branch as better positioned to make
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such decisions.277 The recognition of such negotiated interbranch arrangements
are, I have argued, generally consistent with the Constitution’s ambition of
effective governance, welfare-enhancing, and generally superior to any
dispensation a court would reach through standard constitutional interpretation. It
is also consonant with the growing recognition that an important element of our
constitutional law comprises the “glosses” that institutional actors offer on the
document’s text through their own efforts to deploy the constitution as a working
tool of government under fluctuating social and political circumstances.278 To
recognize the products of institutional negotiation over agenda-control
entitlements is not merely an act of realpolitik—a concession of the judiciary’s
necessary frailty in the teeth of determined political opposition—but a Burkean
recognition of the accumulated wisdom of many generations of Americans’
largely good-faith efforts to implement the Constitution.
Accordingly, I have argued, such bargained-for restructuring of
institutional parameters should be seen as generally desirable evidence of a
constitutional order that is adapting and evolving to fulfill the Framers’ larger
ambition of sound governance. The collapse of constitutional agenda control
mechanisms that is analyzed in this Part fits neatly within this account of a
negotiated structural constitution. By and large, agenda control powers have
shifted to the institution most capable and willing to use them. At the same time,
Congress has retained a plethora of budgetary, regulatory, and rhetorical tools—as
well as its powerful ability to block changes to the status quo—that it ensures it
can play a role when it sees fit to do so. As a result, the constitutional values of
democratic accountability, efficient government, and liberty-promotion do not
seem obviously offended by the constitutional law of agenda control that I have
described.
Instead, it is important to recognize, the main effect of constitutional
agenda control’s erosion is distributive. Rule-making, whether through
legislation, administrative regulation, or judicial precedent, creates winners and
losers. Changing the allocation of agenda-control likely results in a different
outcome, and hence a different pattern of gains and losses in given case. But it is
not clear that the fact that a shift in agenda control influences who loses and who
wins in regulatory battles should have constitutional salience. To be sure, the
House’s loss of control over the budget, the president’s greater power to initiate
regulatory initiatives, and the court’s power to set the constitutional agenda all
mean that the interest groups that prevail in the political process in a given case
are not those that would prevail under a pinched reading of the Constitution’s text.
But the fact that winners and losers switch places in a single case is not of clear
constitutional salience. Over the long term, the flow of benefits and burdens from
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the modified constitutional dispensation is hardly predictable. Moreover, it is not
plainly distinct from the long-term distributive patterns generated by rejecting
changes to the constitutional law of agenda control.
To see this more clearly, consider a recent proposal to construe Article II
to allow presidents to make agency appointments when the Senate fails to act on
his proposed candidates.279 In effect, this moves the influence over regulatory
agendas currently embodied in the appointments process wholly over to the
presidency. Such a change to the law would certainly “alter the bargaining game
between the President and the Senate,” in the sense that the size and composition
of the successful nomination pool would change.280 The distribution of regulatory
winners and losers would accordingly likely change. But it is quite plausible to
think that the change would have no negative systemic effects, but would instead
eliminate the nonconstitutional power of Senate minority factions to extract
exorbitant political rents.281 These factions would lose out, but they might well
adapt by striving harder to obtain the presidency. Or they might turn to the courts.
In the long term, therefore, the distributive effects of changing the constitutional
law of agenda control are uncertain. Factions and interest groups adapt. With
electoral cycle, congressional losers become in time White House winners. The
systemic effects of this single shift in agenda control in contrast are largely
positive or at best neutral, even if the distributional effects in given instances vary
considerably.
The same analysis can be extended, mutatis mutandi, more generally to
historical changes to the constitutional law of agenda control. The large shift of
budgetary authority away from the House and from the legislature likely has
yielded quite different patterns of fiscal winners and losers in discrete cases. But
that alone does not make it suspect. A more robust account of the president’s
recess appointment clause means regulatory missions endorsed by a historical
Congress but disfavored by a contemporary Congress are more likely to advance.
But it is not clear that there is any constitutional reason for concern as a result.
The movement of war and foreign affairs powers away from Congress also results
in a different array of overseas entanglements. Whether that difference is
constitutionally salient is hard to say: Consequentialist analysis likely turns
entirely on one’s views about the merits of specific deployments and international
agreements. The Supreme Court’s functional hegemony over the path of
constitutional adjudication has doubtless altered the mix of disputes and resulting
precedent in comparison to a status quo of greater departmentalism. Again, it is
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hardly plain that this movement can be characterized as positive or negative
without an implicit theory of constitutional interpretation, and a judgment of
whether the Court or the political branches has gotten more questions correct.
One worry, nevertheless, is worth identifying as worthy of more extended
consideration. A potential normative concern raised by the changes mapped in
this Part turns on the gradual disempowerment of Congress, which has
increasingly lost control of the national policy agenda over time.282 At the same
time, there has been a shift of discretionary policy-making authority to both the
executive and the federal courts.283 On this view, the accumulated weight of
changes to the constitutional law of agenda control rises to the level of
constitutional concern because of the imbalance between the branches that has
ensued. Even if individual changes to agenda control, therefore, were negotiated,
their net effect has been an unhealthy emasculation of what the Framers
anticipated would be the most dangerous branch. On this view, for example, the
Court’s broad construction of the recess appointment power in NLRB v. Noel
Canning is problematic.284 Justice Breyer’s majority opinion rested narrowly on a
reading of the “Clause's purpose [that] demands the broader interpretation,”285 one
that emphasized the risk of vacancies in senior agency positions. 286 This
“functionalist” argument, however, does not account for overall trends in the
constitutional law of agenda control. It arguably risks further tilting an interbranch
relationship that is already comprehensively asymmetrical.
A determination of whether Congress has lost ‘too much’ power
implicates hard questions of democratic and constitutional theory. It is far from
clear, to my mind, that a worry about constitutional imbalance against Congress is
well-justified. To begin with, the asymmetry between the executive and Congress
might depend primarily on the sheer size of the regulatory and military state at the
president’s putative command, and on the marked difference in collective
institutional action. Law in general, and the constitutional law of agenda-control
in particular might have only an inframarginal effect. Even if law’s effect is
significant, moreover, the notion of a balance between the branches rests on
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notoriously fragile intellectual premises.287 Further, as a host of empirical studies
show, the policy effects of separated powers are ambiguous, even at the level of
cross-national studies.288 Even discounting the local observation that Congress
these days does not seem incapable of throwing its weight around,289 there are
compelling reasons to think that alarms about constitutional imbalance are not yet
warranted. Instead, complaints of imbalance await a convincing theoretical and
empirical underpinning to render them plausible grounds for complaint about the
shifting terrain of constitutional agenda control.
Conclusion
This Article has developed a new vocabulary for the analysis of
constitutional problems. It has demonstrated that divergent forms of agenda
control are embedded in the Constitution’s text and the Court’s jurisprudence.
Focusing on the separation of powers, I have aimed to demonstrate that agenda
control measures can have the effect of partitioning, dispersing, or concentrating
state power. Future analyses of the Constitution’s function and consequences, to
say nothing of historical constitutional change, should account for the law of
agenda control and the way it has channeled, enabled, and blocked exercises of
state power above in ways that standard accounts fail to capture.

287

See M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV.
1127, 1155–57 (2000) (arguing that ideas of balance or separation provide no determinate answer
to institutional design questions).
288
For a summary of this research, see Aziz Z. Huq, Libertarian Separation of Powers, 8 NYU
J.L. & LIBERTY 1006 (2014)
289
See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauser, Influence of Freedom Caucus Ripples Through Washington,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct 19, 2015, at A1.

61

